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ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE AFTERMATH OF 
RWANDA'S GENOCIDE 
Jason Strain and Elizabeth Keyes" 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Over the span of 100 days in 1994, almost one million Rwandans 
died in a genocide that left Rwandan society traumatized and its insti-
tutions in disarray. The genocide implicated not only the actual insti-
gators and killers, who came hom allleveJs of Rwandan society, but also 
the culture of impunity that had thrived in Rwanda for decades. This 
culture of impunity and inaction in the face of atrocities eerily mirrored 
the international community's failure to intervene to prevent or respond 
to the genocide. The genocide provoked a process of reflection within 
Rwanda and the broader international community about how the geno-
cide came to pass and how Rwanda can rebuild so that such an event 
will never happen again. This chapter attempts one element of this reflec-
tion by considering how the legal mechanisms established in the after-
math of the genocide might help transform the Rwandan culture of 
impunity into a culture of accountability. 
Although the world in 1994 thought about the genocide as an eth-
nic or "tribal" problem, ethnicity masked deeper problems in Rwandan 
society. Since colonial times, Rwandans experienced variations on the 
politics of exclusion, practiced alternately by the Tutsi under colonial 
rule and the Hutu after independence.' Power became an all-or-
Jason and Elizabeth would like to thank Professor Jane Stromseth for 
her invaluable insights, guidance and encouragement throughout the process 
of writing this chapter. Jason thanks Amanda Strain for her support and encour-
agement. Elizabeth would like to thank her husband Nicholas for his unfailing 
supportl and Gloriosa Uwimpuhwe and Paul MiHer for generously sharing their 
insights on the gacaca process. 
1. See generally, PHILIP GOL,REVITCH, ""'lE WJSH TO INFORM You THAT TOMOR-
ROW WE WiLL BE KILLED WITH OUR FA'-1ILlES (1998); MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEt-; 
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nothing proposition, and fear of losing power justified any actions, no 
matter how violent. A cycle of exclusion, fear and repression thus devel-
oped, As the Rwandan Ambassador to the United Nations remarked in 
late 1994, "the perpetrators of [earlier massacres] were never brought to 
justice for their acts. The recent genocide in Rwanda, , , is the direct 
result of this culture of impunity.'" The legal response to genocide must 
therefore do more than hold perpetrators responsible for their actions; 
it must also provide a new model of accountability and reconciliation 
that will serve in the broader societal project of dismantling the culture 
of impunity. 
The legal response to the genocide needs to achieve multiple, often 
competing goals: justice, reconciliation and deterrence, all in the serv-
ice of breaking the cycle of fear and repression that has too long char-
acterized Rwandan politics, The model developing in Rwanda exists at 
three levels: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is 
the international community's effort to hold some of the most serious 
perpetrators accountable for their crimes; the Rwandan national judi-
cial system has shared jurisdiction with the ICTR for the most serious 
crimes, and also handles the many thousands of lower level crimes; and 
the recently inaugurated gacaca courts use a traditional community-based 
legal approach to try all but the most serious of crimes. Each of these 
systems has particular reasons for existence and particular areas of expert-
ise; each has arso encountered serious criticism. ranging from lack of 
efficiency for the lCTR and the national system, to concerns about due 
process in gacaca. This chapter examines how the three mechanisms, 
taken as a whole, may rise above the weaknesses of each component 
part to offer a coherent legal response to genocide, and how the differ-
ent mechanisms can work together in a con1plementary manner to 
achie"e the multiple goals at stake as Rwanda rebuilds. 
Rwanda's creation of a suitably complex and sophisticated legal 
response to the genocide is one reason for cautious hope today. This 
chapter argues that despite the tensions inherent in this tripartite judi-
cial framework, these types of innovative actions can promote account-
Vlcn:-'fS BECOME KtLLERS (2001); GERARD PRLNIER, THr RV\':\:-JDA CR[SIS1959-1994: 
HlSTORY Of A GE"DClDE (1995), 
2. The Situation Concerning Rwanda: Establishment of an InternatJonal 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of 
InteroiltionaJ Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Such Violations Committed in the Territory 
of C\:eighboring States, U,N, SCOR, 49th Sess" 3453rd mtg" U,N, Doc. S/PY,3453 
(1994) [hereinafter IeTR ESTABU5HME'JTj (statemenl of Manzi Bakuramutsa of 
Rwanda); see also MAMDAr-:t, supra note t 185-233. 
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ability for crimes against humanity. The framework provides the 
Rwandan people, their leaders, and the international community with 
the opportunity to shape a new political culture where genocide and 
violence are no longer viewed as acceptable responses to societal frus-
trations. The legal structure cannot ensure the political will to create this 
new culture, but it remains the si1!c qua non for these efforts and there-
fore deserves support from all levels. 
Section B of this chapter discusses the sources of the genocide in 
Rwandan history and provides the background for the national and 
international legal response. Section C examines the role of the ICTR 
and its effectiveness as a legal response by the international community. 
Section 0 turns to the Rwandan national judicial system, discussing its 
prospects for achieving both accountability and reconciliation. Section 
E examines the hopes and concerns relating to the SGcaca process, the 
most innovative part of the tripartite legal response. Section F assesses 
the interrelationships among these three approaches to accountability 
for the Rwandan experience and sets forth lessons for the future, par-
ticularly for the I"'wIy created International Criminal Court. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Roots of Conflict 
On April 6, 1994, a missile shot down the plane carrying President 
Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira of Burundi, pro-
viding the immediate spark for the genocide in Rwanda. The sources of 
the conflagration, however, reach much farther back into Rwanda's his-
tory. The three ethnic groups that comprise the Rwandan population-
Hutu (roughly 84 percent of the population of 8 million), Tutsi (roughly 
15 percent) and Twa (roughly 1 percentj-coexisted in a densely popu-
lated area of land smaller than the state of Maryland. These groups spoke 
the same Kinyarwanda language, worshipped in the same way, and often 
interrnarried. 1 
Despite the groups' unifying characteristics, salient differences existed 
even before colonization. Each group once held a different function in 
Rwandan society: the Twa were hunter-gatherers, the Hutu were culti-
vators, and the Tutsi were pastoralists. In a society that measured wealth 
in terms oi cattle, the Tutsi once stood as the preeminent sodal group. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the intermarriages and iluid boundaries 
among the groups, Tutsis also tended to have Nilotic features, in contrast 
3. See generally P!-(UNIEJ{r supra note 1; GOCREVITCH, supra note 1. 
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to the Bantu features of the Hutu,· European explorers of the late 19th 
century, preoccupied with "race science," seized upon the Tutsi features 
as evidence of innate Tutsi superiority over the Hutu; indeed, these early 
ethnographers cast the Tutsi pedigree back to the Bible and popularized 
the myth that Tutsis were descendants of Ham,; Although the Hamitic 
myth elevated the Tutsi in European eyes, it gave them an ultimately 
undesirable outsider status within Rwanda, which became a powerful 
tool in the 19905 for proponents of Hutu Power. 
During the colonial period, first the Germans (1897-1916) and later 
the Belgians (1916-1959) ignored commonalities among the groups and 
instead built their colonial systems around their beliefs that the minor-
ity Tutsi were the superior group in Rwanda, This system depended 
upon the rigid classification and separation of ethnic groups, and 50 
each Rwandan was issued an identity card establishing whether he or 
she was Hutu, Tutsi or Twa.· Anyone with one Hutu parent and one 
Tutsi parent had to choose one ethnicity. The rigid colonial structure 
simply would not accommodate the real fluidity among the groups.' 
Once the colonizers classified the population, they systematically 
excluded all but a few Hutu and Twa from the privilege, bestowed 
upon Tutsis, specifically education and employment within the colo-
nial government.s 
In the 19505, the forces that underlay the colonial structure began to 
shift. Hutu intellectuals began to argue against the unfairness of the 
existing system, A new wave of colonial administrators, whose work-
ing class origins in Flemish Belgium led them to sympathize more with 
the Hutu masses than the Tutsi elite, encouraged these arguments. In 
1959, the first episode of political violence between Hutu and Tutsi 
erupted, from which the Hutu emerged as the dominant political force, 
In the midst of the violence, Belgium began organizing the transition to 
Rwandan self-government. Independence came in 1962, and with it a 
short· lived regime that shared power between Hutu and Tutsi parties. 
Events in 1963, however, altered the way that the two groups would 
interact for years to come, Tutsis in exile in Burundi launched the 50-
called inyenzi9 raids against the new Hutu government; the raids were 
4. Generally, Nilotic ethnldties tend to be taller and have lighter com-
pleXIons and more angular fadal features, while many Bantu ethnidties tend to 
be shorter and "stockier," with less sharp facial features, See MAMDAl\'r, sup/'{} 
note 1, at 44. 
5. See GOUREVITCH, supra note l~ at 55, 
6. Jd, at .56-57, 
7, Jd. 
8, Sef' PRUNIER, supra note j f at 33. 
9. Inyenzi means cockroach in Kinyarwanda; the term was used frotn the 
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quickly suppressed, but their real costs were prolound-Hutus killed 
10,000 Tuts;s in retribution, and the Hutu government dosed the door 
on Tutsi political participation,IO The raids provided a vital tool to those 
in lavor of exclusion, who manipulated Hutu fears of future Tutsi inva-
sions into support lor completely excluding Tutsis,1J Tutsis would be 
denied any meaningful political voice for another three decades, 
2. Events leading Up to 1994 
By the late 19805, a split arose within Juvenal Habyarimana's Hutu 
government. Moderates within his party held an indusive vision of 
Rwandan society and engaged in reforms to reopen Rwandan politics 
to Tutsi participation; this group's influence led the Rwandan govern-
ment to adopt the 1993 Aru5ha Accords establishing a transition to true 
power-sharing, The party's extremist wing, which saw exclusion and 
extermination of Tutsis as the only way to secure peace in Rwanda, 
increasingly criticized the moderate vision, This political force gave rise 
to the genOcidal "Hutu Power" movement in the 19905." Although the 
extremist wing originally lacked a broad base of popular support, its 
proponents were at the center of power and induded Habyarimana's 
wife and her politically powerful extended family, As moderates moved 
closer and closer to power-sharing, the extremists became ever more vir-
ulent in their crusade against Tuts;s, employing all available media 
resources in their efforts to create anti-Tutsi sentiment across Rwanda. 
This extremism gained in popularity as Tutsis made their first seri-
ous efforts since the early 19605 to regain their place in Rwanda, The 
more than 300,000 Tutsis who fled Rwanda in the 1959-1963 period had 
settled as semi-permanent refugees in neighboring Congo,l1LJganda, 
Burundi, and Tanzania, l' This original refugee population doubled as 
the Hutu government in Rwanda scapegoated Tutsis, provoking peri-
odic massacres which encouraged more Tutsis to flee, l' Particularly in 
19605 through the early 199051 when Hutu Power radio stations broadcast their 
message of destruction using "inyenziO as a code word for TutsL Scc id. 
10. See PRUNIER, supra note 1 at 56-57. 
11. MA\1DANI; supra note 1 at 130-13L 
12. P[WN!ER, supra note 1, at 18R 
13. Congo became Zaire in 1971, and \-vas renamed the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in 1997. See, e.g., Timeline: Democratic Republic of Congo, BBC NEWs., 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/1072684.shn. 
14. Estimates of the refugee population vary, but range from 330,000 in the 
camps to 500,000, including "self-settled" refugees. See PRU!\J[ER, supra note L at 67, 
15. J. Matthew Vaccaro, Politics ofGenodde: Peacekeeping and Dis(15ter Relief 
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Uganda, many of these exiled Tutsis received schooling and were wel-
comed into the army and government service l ' These refugees formed 
the nucleus of what became the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a mili-
tary and political entity detennined to return to Rwanda which, in 1990, 
launched an invasion into northwestern Rwanda calling for an end to 
exclusion.17 
The RPF invasion and subsequent civil war increased the appeal of 
the extremist Hutu Power message, ensuring the extremists' victory in 
the power struggle within Habyarimana's government. As Mahmood 
Mamdani, a noted scholar of post-colonial identity in Africa, writes, "for 
the first time since the inyenz; raids of the early 196Os, the ]990 invasion 
raised the specter of Tutsi Power inside Rwanda ... the fact was that 
many inside the country agreed that RPF rule would mean nothing but 
the return of Tutsi domination:'l. The interplay of history and fear served 
the most radical goals of the extremists, who set about organizing the 
events that the world watched unfold in April 1994. 
3. The Genocide of 1994 
The genocide sparked by Habyarimana's assassination on the night 
of April 6 began qUickly. Within 45 minutes of the plane crash, militias 
set up roadblocks in the capital to stop and kill Tutsis who were pass-
ing through the city or trying to escape. By daybreak the Presidential 
Guard had brutally murdered Prime Minister Agathe Cwilingiyimana H 
Uwilingiyimana was a leading proponent of the Arusha power-sharing 
arrangement and with her death the "agenda of reconciliation ceased 
to exist."'" Lists that Hutu Power proponents had compiled in painstak-
ing detail for this purpose months earlier were used to quickly find and 
kill Tutsis and moderate Hutus throughout Kigali. The interim govern-
ment used the infamous Radio Tilt!vision Libre des A1mes Collines to full 
effect, bombarding the airwaves with incitement to violence and geno-
in R.1Dlmdaf in UN PEACEKEEPINC, AMER[CA:\." POLICY AXD THE Ur-.;C1VfL WA;:{S OF THE 
199OS, 367. 370 (William J. Durch ed .• 1996). . 
16, PRVNfER, supra note 1, at 67. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was 
ol1ce considered a dangerous outsider, and Vlas even accused by his predeces-
sor Milton Obote of being a Rwandan himself. Museveni \-vas therefore sympa~ 
thebe to the fhvandan exiles, and his rise to power in 1986 "vas a boon to the 
Rwandan exile community in t:ganda. See id. 
17. MA\lJ)A"l, supra nott' L at 189. 
18. rd. 
19. Vaccaro, supra note 15, at 37:l 
20. Set: r..-1AMUANi, supra note 1, at 216. 
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cide every hour of the day. Within two weeks, an estimated 250,000 Tutsis 
had been killed across the country2! The killings were done at road-
blocks and in churches, at the behest of Hutu mayors and by neighbors 
in rural villages. Resistance was not tolerated; one prefect who disobeyed 
orders and kept his district calm in the first weeks of the genocide was 
murdered by the interim government's hand-picked replacement in late 
April in front of the citizens of the town.22 
The role played by the churches exemplifies the complete social and 
institutional decay that prevailed during the genocide. Many Tutsis ini-
tially sought sanctuary in the churches, believing that the genocidaires 
would not enter houses of worship. However, despite some remarkable 
instances of courage and resistance, the sanctuaries became scenes of 
some of the grisliest killings of the genocide when priests and ministers 
abandoned those gathered to the killing mobs outside. The chilling title 
of Philip Gourevitch's book We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will 
Be Killed With Our Families tells of a group gathered at an Adventist church, 
who learned that they were scheduled to be killed the next day. They 
wrote their Hutu pastor seeking his intercession on their behalf, believ-
ing that he could help them if he would. The pastor responded, "You 
must be eliminated. God no longer wants yoU."23 The close association 
between the Hutu government and the Catholic Church in particular led 
to several notorious instances of church complicity with the genocide. 
Even where the churches were not complicit, they were often ineffective 
at calling for an end to the violence.2'~ In either case, when the genocide 
was finished, the churches had lost most if not all of their moral author-
ity, and were ill-positioned to promote peace or reconciliation. 
By the time the RPF secured its military victory in the civil war and 
put an end to the genocide in August 1994, an estimated 800,000 people 
had been killed, the vast majority of them Tutsi." The RPF had succeeded 
21. ALLISON DES FORGES, LEAVE NO:"JE TO TELL THE STORY. GENOCIDE IN R\VAKDA 
(Human Rights Watch, 1994). 
22. See MA1-1DA:"JI, supra note 1, at 218. 
23. GOL1REVITCH, supra note 1, at 28. 
24. PRCKIER, supra note 1, at 250. 
25. Finding an exact number has proved exceedingly difficult. See letter 
from Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to President of the 
United Nations Security Council, Dec. 9, 1994, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., P 20, U.N. 
Doc. 5/1994/1405 (1994) [hereinafter AN"lAN LETTER] (estimating 500,000 dead); 
Hirondelle Foundation, q[ficial Census Puts Genocide Toll at Over One Million, 
available al http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle.nsf/(Feb.11. 2002) (last vis-
ited May 22, 2002) (citing new Rwandan Census Figures that place the death 
toll at over 1 million). Recent estimates almost unanimously place the figure at 
close to 1 million. 
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in regaining power, but it inherited a country whose institutions had 
been frayed if not destroyed, and whose population was deeply trau-
matized by the genocide. Meanwhile, approximately 1.2 million Hutu 
refugees fled across the border into Zaire, into refugee camps run by 
international aid organizations at a cost of roughly $1 million a day. 
Although many of the refugees were simply swept up in the chaos and 
had not participated in the genocide, the genocidaires quickly asserted 
control over the camps, benefiting from the international aid while pos-
ing a terrifying security risk to those attempting to resume their lives 
just across the border in Rwanda. 
The genocide left no aspect of Rwandan life unharmed. The Rwandan 
economy, long in decline, was in shreds by August 1994.26 Land, infra-
structure and financial structures were all destroyed. The legal system 
fared no better; the judiciary existed more in theory than in practice, with 
fewer than 400 surviving judges, prosecutors and investigators. Some of 
those lawyers who survived were charged with taking part in the geno-
cide." Most important, the new government had to face the reality of 
governing a nation comprised of an extraordinary number of highly trau-
matized individuals. Genocide survivors included legions of children 
rendered orphans by the violence, children born of rape, families dis-
placed from their homes, and witnesses to unspeakable atrocities. 
Rwandans had to begin the task of figuring out how perpetrators and 
victims could live side-by-side while the smell of death hung in the air. 
4. International Role and Response 
Among the international community, only the neighboring coun-
tries and France and Belgium took a real interest in Rwanda's political 
developments. 28 Eventually, as part of the Arusha Accords, the United 
Nations agreed to place a peacekeeping force, the UN. Assistance Mission 
for Rwanda (UNAMIR), in Rwanda in late 1993. UNAMIR was limited 
by its mandate (no Chapter VII ability to enforce peace), by its size and 
location (2,500 personnel in Kigali alone) and most of all by the frayed 
nerves of the international community following the deaths of 18 
26. See PRUNIER, supra note 1, at 306 
27. See c.g., Hirondelle News Agency, Survivors Accuse 14 Defencr 
Investigators of Genocide Crimes (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://\,.,lww.hiron-
delle.org/hirondelle.nsf I. 
28. Belgium became involved because it had many Belgian nationals liv-
ing in Rwanda, and France took an interest for less clear reasons, possibly rebt-
ing to what Prunier has called its "Fa shod a syndrome," or fear of Anglophone 
supremacy in Africa. PRCKIER, supra note 1, at 105. 
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American peacekeepers in Somalia in October 19932 ' Although the 
prospects for severe violence, if not genocide, were well known to General 
Dallaire of Canada, the commander of UNAMIR forces, he was unable 
to convince the U.N. to increase UNAMIR's size or change its mandate.") 
Indeed, as the genocide broke oot and ten Belgian peacekeepers were 
killed, the U.N. Security Council voted to scale down its operations in 
Rwanda, leaving Dallaire with only 620 troops." By August 1994, only 
the French had actually mobilized troops to intervene; unfortunately, 
the French intervention, known as Operation Turquoise~ seemed suspi-
ciously pro-Hutu at the time, and has been even more widely discred-
ited since 1994.32 
The United States was notoriously slow to use the word "genocide" 
to describe what was unfolding io Rwanda. Although debate rages about 
who knew what and when, observers widely assumed at the time that 
the slowness was motivated by fear of the legal repercussions triggered 
by using the word genocide-repercussions that would have demanded 
action." Then-President Bill Clinton told genocide survivors at Kigali 
airport in 1998 that the international community "did not do as much 
as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred in 
Rwanda. , .. The international community, together with the nations in 
Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy."" This 
admission seems inadequate, however, in light of the active efforts the 
u.s. Administration led to prevent deployment of peacekeepers and to 
keep the U,I\:. from using the word "genocide."" 
This coIleelive inaction in the face of one of the 20th century's worst 
genocides has left a complicated legacy of guilt in the international com-
munity, from the United Nations to the aid organizations who, with very 
few exceptions, did not help the victims of the genocide but did help 
29. PRcNlER, supra note I, at 274-75. 
30, See Samt1ntha Power, Bystanders to Genocide: Why the Unffed States Let 
the Rwandan Tragedy Happen, ATL I\,fO!\''THlY (Sept. 2001)~ available of http://www. 
thea tlantic.com / issues / 2001 /09/ power.hlm, 
31. Vaccaro, supra note 15, at 383, 
32. See e,g" Jean !Ytarie Kamatali, Freedom of Expression and Its Limitations: 
The Case of the Rwandan Genocide 38 5TA'l. j. I"'T'L L 57, 70 (2(J02) (noting that 
France, in Operation Turquoise, "'protected the forces that committed genocide 
and facilitated their flight to Congo"), 
33. See e,g., Douglas Jehl, Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings 
'Genocide: N,Y, T1MES, June 10, 1994, at A8 (noting that the Clinton Administration 
feared both legal repercussions and moral imperatives to intervene). 
34, James Bennet, Clinton Declares U.s., With ~Vorld, Failed Rwandans, N.Y. 
TtMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at 1A. 
35, See Power, suprll note 30. 
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Hutu refugees, including both perpetrators and other Hutus swept up 
in the chaos. UN. Secretary-General Koli Annan, Under· Secretary lor 
peacekeeping at the time of the genocide, acknowledged that "[aJl! of 
us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it. "36 Such 
guilt spurred belated interest in the Rwandan situation, and the United 
Nations took concrete action by creating an international criminal tri-
bunal in late 1994." 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 
After passing numerous resolutions on the tumultuous situation in 
Rwanda both before and after the genocide,'" the Security Council eslab-
lished the lCTR on Kovember 8,1994 with the passage of Resolution 
955." The ICTR became the second Security CounCIl-implemented insti-
36. United Nations, Secretary~Gt'neral Statetnent on Receiving the Report of 
the independcl'lt Inquiry Into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 
Genocide it} Rwanda (Dec. 10, 1999), available at http://ww\'I;,.un.org/News/ossg/ 
sgsm_rwanda.htm. 
37. Mark Matthews, !us!il,,);' Stili Eludes 5tlrvivors of 1994 Genocide ifl Rwanda, 
BALTIMORE Su,", May 6, 1996, at IA (quoting Alison desForges, who said thai the 
ICTR sprang from an "excess of guilt" atter the world bod): failed to intervene 
to prevent or to stop the slaughter the previou~ spring}. 
38. Sec, e.g., U.N. Security Council Resolution 929, U.K SCOR, 49th Sess., 
3392nd Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/REs/920 (June 22,1994) (establishing a temporary 
multinationaJ operation [or humanitarian purposes in Rv.'anda until the deploy-
ment of the expanded U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda); U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 928, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 33915t Meeting, U.1\'. Doc. 
S/Rrs/928 (June 20, 1994) (extending the mandate of the L:.N. Observer Mission 
Uganda-Rwanda); U.N. "''emily Council Resolution 92.5, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 
3388th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/92S (June 8,1994) (extending the mandate of 
and deploying t\vo additional battalions of the U.N. Assistance Mission tor 
Rwanda and settlement of the conflict in Rv"canda); U.?\:. Security Council 
Resolution 918, UN. SCOR, 49th Sess" 3377th M('€ting, U.N. Doc. S/REs/9I8 
(May 171 1994) (expanding the mandate of the U.N, Assistance Mission for 
Rwanda and imposing an arms embargo on Rwanda); U.N. S('curity Council 
Resolution 912, U.N. SCOl~; 49th Sess., 3368th Meeting, U.:\. Doc. S/REs/912 
(Apr. 21, 1994) (adjusting the mandate of the UN. Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
due to the new events in the Rwandan conflict); U.N. Security Council Rt-'Soiution 
909, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess" 3358th Meeting, U.N. Doc. S/RES/909 (Apr. 5, 1994) 
(extending the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mission for Rwanda and imple-
menting the Arusha Peace Agreement); U.N. Security CouncH Resolution 893, 
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3326th Meeting, e.N. Doc. S/RESi893 (jan. 6,1994) 
(deploying the U.N. Assistance r.,Hssion tor Rwanda and implementing the 
Arusha Peace Agreement), 
39. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd 
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tuilon created to deal with violations of international humanitarian law 
in a span of only a few years. In 1995, the ICTR initiated proceedings in 
Arusha, Tanzania, In the subsequent seven years, the ICTR has amassed 
a mixed but increasingly strong record in its prosecution of high level 
genocidaires. Its success in achieving the other goals of post-genocide 
Rwanda, however, has been more limited, 
1. Background and Goals of the ICTR 
International community inaction during the genocide quickly trans-
formed into a post-genocide drive to establish an international tribunal 
to hold the genocidaires accountable, Although the initial request for such 
a tribunal came from the Government of Rwanda,'" members of the UN. 
Security Council readily embraced the proposal. 
The Rwandan government's goals for the ICTR were several. First, 
the tribunal would involve the international community in seeking 
accountability for the genocide, which would ensure impartiality and 
avoid a perception of "victor's justice'! in Rwanda.'H Second, the 
Rwandan government pragmatically believed that an international body 
would have better access to criminals residing in foreign couniries,42 
Third, and perhaps most important, the Rwandan government felt that 
a high-level, international commitment to prosecuting the genocide 
crimes would recognize that what happened in Rwanda rose to the level 
of crimes against humanity and against the international community as 
a whole. As the Rwandan ambassador diplomatically stated, the inter-
national community was "also harmed by the genocide."" Indeed, 
reminding the international community of Rwanda's suffering contin-
ued to be important to Rwandans; when then-President Clinton arrived 
at Kigali airport in 1998, one government official told a reporter, "to feel 
the President of the United States shares our sadness and the tragedy 
with us is very good ,"44 In short, achieving accountability for the geno-
cide in Rwanda was a responsibility shouldered more broadly than by 
Rwanda alone, 
Meeting, U.N. Doc, S/REs/95.; (1994). The Annex to this resolution is the Statute 
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, hereinafter lCTR Statute. 
40, See Letter from Manzi Bakuramutsa,. Permanent Representative of 
Rwanda to the President of the Se<:urity Council, Sept. 28, 1994, U.N. SCOR, 49th 
Sess., 4, U.N. Doc. Sil994/1115, 




44. Bennct/ supra note 34, 
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The international community shared many of the initial goals artic-
ulated by the Rwandan government. As the British Ambassador to the 
t:.N. stated on approving the leTR Resolution; "It is our hope that the 
Tribunal ... will prove by experience to be one which meets the objec-
tives shared by the international community and Rwanda: that justice 
should be done and that thereby the communities may be reconciled."" 
Specific objectives of the international community in establishing the 
leTR were to bring those respoosible to justice and to recognize that the 
egregious crimes committed in Rwanda clearly violated international 
law.'" As Nigerian Ambassador Ibrahim Gambar! stated, "the issue at 
stake here is the need to punish collectively crimina 1 acts against human-
ity; the issue is not geographical [ocation."47 Those who established the 
lCTR also hoped to deter future genocide and ultimately contribute to 
a process of reconciliation in Rwanda, 
Additionally, the international community agmed with the need to 
avoid any appearance of victor's justice" As the Rwandans themselves 
recognized, the overwhelmed legal system in Rwanda had little prospect 
of objectively, impartially and expeditiously moving through the enor-
mous docket of cases before it. The United Nations Commission of 
Experts, created by the Secretary General following the genocide, found 
that the scale of crimes committed would pose daunting problems for 
the Rwandan judicial system, and that the environment for domestic tri-
als would be too raw to permit impartiality.'" The international com-
munity agreed that to change the culture of impunity a tribunal needed 
to be established to handle these cases as neutrally as possible.5O 
One subtle difference between the international community's goals 
and those of Rwanda can be glimpsed through the diplomatic statements 
of the various ambassadors to the Security CounciL Both the interna-
tional community and Rwanda stated the importance of recognizing the 
genocide as a crime against all humanity. However, the Rwandan gov-
ernment was understandably especially concerned with creating a deter-
rent effect "'ithin Rwanda itself, while the international community saw 
45. See ICTR ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 2 (statement of David Hannay of 
the United Kingdom). 
46. 1.1. 
47. See ICTR ESTABLISHMENT, supra note 2 (statement of Ibrahim Gambarl 
of Nigeria). 
48. See ICTR ESTABlISHME[\.:;, supra note 2 (statement of Madeline Albright 
of the United States); see also ICTR ESTABLISHMEl\T, supra note 2 (statement of 
David Hannay of the United Kingdom), 
49. See Letter Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed 
to the President of the Securitv Council, U.N. Doc. 5/1994/1125 (1994). 
SO. See id.; ICTR ESTABliHME'J'i f supra note 2 (statement of David Hannay 
of the United Kingdom). 
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the possibility for using the ICTR in a less context-specific way to send 
a message across the world tha t perpetrators of genocide would be held 
accountable for their actions,51 Yet both Rwanda and the members of the 
Security Council hoped that an international tribunal could help to dis-
pense justice as well as deter genocide in the future, 
Despite this general convergence in goals for the ICTR, the govern-
ment of Rwanda was ultimately disappointed with the Statute estab-
lishing the tribunal. Indeed Rwanda was sufficiently dissatisfied that it 
offered the lone dissenting vole on November 8, 1994 when the Security 
Council approved the Statute,52 The Rwandan government disagreed 
less with the Statute's overall goals than with the means adopted for 
achieving them, The Rwandan Ambassador named seven reasons why 
his government could not support the Statote as drafted, First, he believc'<i 
the temporal jurisdiction was inadequate to recognize the extent of the 
planning for the genocide, much of which happened prior to 1994.53 
Second, he predicted that the structure of the tribunaL with its limited 
number of chambers and staff, would be overwhelmed with the "mag-
nitude of the task awaiting [it],"" Third, the Statute did not adequately 
prioritize which crimes would be prosecuted, and he feared that crimes 
of genocide might not receive the highest level of attention,55 Fourth, 
the Ambassador opposed the idea that countries involved with the Huto 
regime could nominate candidates for pOSitions as ICTR judges}· Fifth, 
he was dismayed that decisions about where to hold detainees would 
be made not by Rwanda or the ICTR, but by other countries.'? Sixth, the 
Ambassador protested the disparity in sentenCing possibilities between 
the Rwandan penal code, which permitted capital punishment, and the 
ICTR Statute, which did not. 53 Finally, the Ambassador expressed grave 
reservations about the decision to locate the ICTR outside of Rwanda,'9 
In short, the tribunal as structured fell short of what the Rwandan gov-
ernment deemed necessary to prosecute the crimes of genocide at the 
level and intensity which it believed was merited, Whether these fears 
were justified will be addressed below. 
51. Compare {eTR ESTABUSH!\1ENT, supra note 2 (statement of David Hannay 
of the United Kingdom), with ICTR ESTABLISHME~T; supra note 2 (statement of 
Manzi Bakuramulsa of Rwanda), 
52. Sec Voting Information, S/RES/955 (1994), availobleat ~ww.unbis.un,org/ 
(last visited Apr, t 2002). 
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2. Structure, Jurisdiction and Procedures of the ICTR 
The U.N. Security Council defined the structure, jurisdictional lim· 
its, and basic procedural rules for the [CTR in the Annex to Resolution 
955. Structurally, the rcTR Statute establishes three trial chambers in 
Arusha. Tanzania, a registry also in Arusha, and an appeals chamber 
and head prosecutor which the tribunal shares with the International 
Criminal Tribunal ior Yugoslavia (lCTY). The Security Council estab· 
lished this infrastructure-sharing with the ICTY to minimize costs. 
The ICTR Statute lays out the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTR. 
Article I of the Statute mandates that the ICTR focus on cases that deal 
with crimes of "genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law" that occurred in Rwanda or that were perpetrated 
by Rwandan citizens in neighboring states.6IlArticle 2 of the ICTR Statute 
defines genocide as any of several acts "committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group."6! The 
ICTR also has authority to try cases of crimes against humanity&2 and 
violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of Additional 
Protocol II. 6J 
60. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, UN. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd 
Meeting, U.N. Doc. SiRES/90S § 1 (Nov. 8, 1994); see al,o ICTR Statute, supra 
note 39, .,t art. L 
61. ICTR Statute, supra note 39, at art. 2. The listed acts are as follows: "(a) 
Killing members of th(' group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members 01 the group; (e) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions 01 life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.!; Genocide, conspiracy to commit geno-
cide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit geno~ 
cide, and complicity in genocide are all listed as punishable acts, ld. 
62, See ICrR Statute, supra note 39, at art. 3 (listing murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment~ torture, raper persecution on politi-
cal, radat or religious grounds~ and other inhumane acts as crimes against 
humanity), 
63, See ICTR Statute. supm note 39, at art 4; Geneva Conventions; Addi-
tional Protocol II. The ICTR Statute lists these violations as including "(a) Violence 
to life, health and physical or mental ""'Tell-being of persons, in particular mur-
der.;'ls well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corpo-
ral puni&hment; (b) Collective punishment; (c) Taking of hostages; (d) Acts of 
terrorism; (e-) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humHiating and 
degrading treatment rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent a<;sauit; 
(t) Pillage; (g) The passing of sentences ilnd the carrying out of executions with-
out previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording 
aU the judicial guarantees which are recognized .1.5 indispensable by civilized 
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Two jurisdictional features of the Statute are particularly notewor-
thy. First, Resolution 955 and the ICTR Statute limit the trihunal's juris-
diction by both date and subject matter.'4 The ICTR's jurisdiction is 
limited temporally to crimes that occurred between January 1, 1994 and 
December 31,1994, the period immediately before and immediately after 
the genocide."' This temporal limitation has contributed to the tension 
that exists between the ICTR and the Rwandan gO\·ernment. Second, the 
ICTR Statute creates concurrent jurisdiction with the Rwandan national 
courts, with primacy given to the international tribunal'"' Article 8 of 
the ICTR Statute expressly states that the ICTR "shall have primacy over 
the national courts of all states/' moreover, the tribunal is empowered 
to intervene in any national trial subject to its jurisdiction and formally 
request any state to defer to ICTR's competence.'7 Concurrent jurisdic-
tion generally will be present in future attempts to prosecute genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal 
Court, and this presents challenging issues of law and policy regarding 
the relationships among different courts.6!l The Rwanda experience, dis-
cussed below, illuminates some of the difficult issues that can arise in 
pursuing complementary national and international approaches to 
accountabHity that do not work at cross purposes. 
The U.N. Security Council ensured that states would be obligated 
to cooperate with the ICTR by establishing the tribunal under Chapter 
VI1 of the I..:.N. Charter." Resolulion 955 requires states to "cooperate fully" 
petlples; (11) Threats to commit any of the foregoing acts." ICTR Statute, supra 
note 39, at art. 4. 
64. Compare Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
art L fl'vailable at http://www.un.org/ict}'/basic/statut/statute.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 22, 2002) (no temporal restriction) with ICTR Statute (temporal juris-
diction limited lo 1994), ,upm note 39. 
65. U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd 
Meeting, U.N. Doc. SjREs/9.55 § 1 (1994); E'er? also ICTR Statute, supra note 39, at 
art 1. Note that in this respect the ICTR Statute differs from the Rwandan 
Genocide Law, which covers offenses dating back to October 1, 1990. SCI? Organk 
Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime 
of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 1990 
[h€'reinafter Rwandan Genocide Law]. 
66. TCTR Statute; supra note 39. at art. 8 
67. ld. 
68. The jurisdictional provisions ot the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminai Court and issues of complementarity are dtscussed infra, iu Section F3. 
69. See U.N. Charter, Ch. Vfl; PAVL J. MAG"ARELLA, lV'STiCE '" AFRICA, 
RWANDA'S GE:-;OCroE, ITS COURTS, A!,-;D THE UN CRIVlJNAL TRlBUNA:" 43 (2000) (By 
going the U.N. Chapler VII route, the Security Council obliged all U.K. mem-
ber states to cooperate with the tribunal and to honor any lawful requests it 
makes for assistance under the ICTR Statute} 
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with the ICTR, to formulate domestic law measures necessary to imple-
ment the resolution, and to comply with orders and requests issued by 
the TCTR,7o Through Resolution 955, the U.N, Security Council also 
"urge[d] states and non-governmental organizations to contribute funds, 
equipment and services to the lCTR."71 In short, the ICTR looks to many 
states for assistaoce in fulfilTing its goals. 
The ICTR's rules of procedure and decision come from the broad 
outlines Taid out in the ICTR Statute, from the practice of the ICTY, and 
from the judges of the ICTK A dynamic common to the creation of other 
international courts arose in formulating rules of procedure for the lCTR: 
how best to meld the common law and civil law systems into a single 
functioning tribunal?" An interesting aspect of the civil-common law 
debate is the varying treatment accorded to witnesses in the two sys-
tems, In Rwanda's civil!aw system, and under its rules of criminal pro-
cedure, witnesses for the prosecution provide written statements, and 
testify only if the defense seeks to cross-examine them." In the common 
law system, evidence for the prosecution is adduced only by having 
each witness testify." The hvo approaches make some trade-offs between 
efficiency and transparency?' Cltimately, the lCTR is more balanced 
70. L.:\", Security Council Resolution 955, U,N, SCOR, 49th 5e"., 3453rd 
Meeting, U.N, Doc SiREs/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), Article 28 of the tCTR Statute clar-
ifies states' obligations "'lith regard to cooperation and judicial assistance. States 
are required to cooperate with the ICTR in investigating and punishing viola-
tions of humanHarian law, and to "comply without undue delay vdth any request 
for 3s!:>lstance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber/' including requests to locate 
individuals, take testimony. give up evidence, serve documents, arrest or detain 
individuals. and surrender or transfer accused individuals to the ICTR. See ICTR 
Statute, supra note 39, at art. 28. Obviously, the obligation to surrender or trans-
fer individuals located vvithin another country is controversial. In practice, the 
ICTR tries to avoid direct confrontation vvhen possible, through the use of nego-
tiations and other more subtle tactics. However, it reserves the right to report 
non-conlplying states to the Security CounciL See Frederik Harhoff, Consonance 
or Rivalry? Calibrating the Efforts 10 Prosecute War Crimes;n National and Internati(mai 
Tribunal" 7 DUKE J, CO"". & ]'JT'L L 571, at 580-81 (1997). 
71. LN. Security Council Resolulion 955, U,N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd 
;"feeling, "US, Doc, S/RES/95S CNov, 8, 1994). 
72. See generafly h'TER:"iATI0~ALAl\TI :-.iATIONAL PROSEcuno;,\; OF CHIMES UNDER 
INl1::r(l''';KrtO!\AL LAW: CURRE'lT DEvELOPME)J1S (Horst Fischer, Claus Kress, & Sascha 
Roll Lilder, eds., 200]). 
73. See Reply of the Government of the Republic of Rwanda to the Report 
of Amnesty International Entitled "Rwanda: Unfair Trials-Justice Denied" (1997), 
available at http://www.nvandemb.org/prosecution/reply.htm{last visited Aug. 
2, 2002} Ihereinafter RWANDAN RESPONSE TO AMl\ES1Y INTERNAEOl\AL], 
74. See id. 
75. Compare RWA\JDA",· RESPONSE TO AMf\;ESTY INTERNATIONAL supra, note 73, 
-
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towards the Common law system, while the Rwandan genocide trials 
are conducted within the civHlaw system, as will be discussed below?' 
Thus established, the ICTR began its work in earnest in 1995.'7 
3. Achievements of the ICTR 
As of October 2002, the ICTR has produced a small but ever-grow-
ing body of case law. It has completed 11 trials, with the following results: 
five prisoners have received life imprisonment; three more have received 
sentences of 25, 13, and 12 years, respectively. One suspect has been 
acquitted, and the acquittal was upheld on appea]7' One defendant who 
received a life sentence at trial still has an appeal pending. As of October 
2002, the ICTR had 61 detainees in custody. In addition to those whose 
trials have been completed and who are serving sentences, 22 individ-
uals are currently On trial in 8 separate proceedings; 31 others presently 
await triaJ.7' Those convicted, on trial. or awaiting trial encompass a 
broad spectrum of Rwandan society. induding national and local polit-
ical officials, military omcers, businessmen, students, doctors, pastors, 
musicians, and journalists; they include the pastor who refused to help 
his Adventist congregation, and the man who ran the hate radio station, 
Radio TeJeuision Libre des Milles Collines." In less than a decade, more 
than 230 witnesses have appeared before the Tribunal to give testimony 
in support of the prosecution or defense, and the lCTR has decided more 
than 500 moti ons. Sl 
with AMNESTY INTER)lATIOt>..AL, RW,;,NDA: THE TROUBLED COURSE OF JUSTICE, AFR 
47/015/2000 (Apr. 26, 2000), available at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/lndexl 
AFR470152000 (last visited Aug. 2, 2002) [hereinafter TROLBLED COL'RSE OF 
JUSTJCE]. 
76. Sec, e.g._r VlRG1:\lA 1.·10RRIS & MICHAEl E ScHARF, THE I~lER~A~lONAL CRIM~ 
INAL TRIBU~AL FOR RWA"OA 49, 416 (1.998) (The ICTY and the ICTR essentially 
followed "the adversarial approach of the common law systems," although they 
inCOrpOftlted elements of the inquisitorial dvillaw system.). For more infor-
mation about ICTR procedures beyond the scope of thi5 chapterJ see ICTR Rules 
of Procedure and EvicienceJ available at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot.ENG-
L1SH/rules/310501/index.htm (last visited May 17, 2002). 
77, See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Tributlal at a Glance, 
available a/ http://www.ictr.org/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2002). 
78. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, [eTR Defaiflees-Status 
on I:ebruary 8, 2002, aFaiiable a/ http://www.ictr.org/ENGLlSHlfactsheets/ 
detainee.htm (last visited Oct. 10,2002). Other individuals have been detained 
since Feb, 8, 2002. See http:;"fWW\v-ictr,org, 
79. Sec rd. 
80. See id. 
81. See International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, The Tribuna] at a 
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Two trials are particularly signiiicant for international criminal jus-
tice. First, on September 2, 1998, Jean Paul Akayesu became the first indi-
vidual convicted of the crime of genocide by an international criminal 
court.b2 Akayesu, the former Bourgmestre of Taba in Gitaranla province, 
was found guilty on nine (Qunts, including genocide, direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity (torture, 
rape, and other inhumane actsl.'" Second, on September 4, 1998, the 
lCTR Trial Chamber sentenced former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean 
Kambanda to life in prison; Kambanda had pled guilty to counts of geno-
cide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to 
cOlllmlt genocide, complicity in genocide! and crimes against human-
ity" The Kambanda decision showed that international tribunals would 
not necessarily shy away from punishing heads of state for heinous acts 
taken during their terms of office-it may set a precedent for future ICC 
or tribunal action. The prosecution of national leaders such as Kambanda 
may present special opportunities for cooperation between international 
and national aclors, as a head of state may fear international judgment 
more than the judgment of a domestic court over which he or she has 
influence, or continues to have vestiges of influence after leaving office. 
The deterrent effect on criminal activities by heads of state may there-
fore be greater in the international tribunal. 
4. Effectiveness 01 the ICTR 
Rwanda's relationship with the ICTR has been strained from the 
Tribunal's inception, because of Rwanda's unmet expectations and 
because of the performance of the ICTR itself, One of the most impor-
tant sources of disagreement between Rwanda and the ICTR has been 
the Tribunal's limited temporal jurisdictIOn. On the one hand, the lim· 
ited jurisdiction provides a clear mandate and scope of power to the 
Rwandan tribunaL This sort of bright-line starting and stopping point 
Glance, Fact Sheet No, I, June 2001, available at http://www-ictwrg/ENG-
LTSH(factsheets/Lhtm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002). 
82. Sce Tile Prosecutor "- Jcall·Pauj Akayrsu, ICTR·96-4-T (Sept 2, 1998), amil· 
able at http://www.ictr.org{lastvisitedSept.29.20(2).This decision was subse-
quently upheld by the ICTR Appeals Olamber in The Pf'L'Sccutor '1.'. leal1~P!1Ul AktlYBU 
(June l, 2001), availaMe at http://www-ictcorg (last visited Sept. 29, 2002). 
83. See id. 
84. See The Prosentlor v. Jean Kambrwdu. ICTR-97-23-S (May 1/ 1998), avai!-
able al http://www.ictr.org(last visited Sept. 29, Z002). This decision was sub-
sequently upheld by the ICTR Appeals Chamber in lean K"mbandn 1'. The 
Pmsecultlr, ICTR-97-23·A (Oct. 19,2000), avai/aille at http://wIVw.ictr.org (last 
visited Mar, 221 2002). 
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makes clear where the international community's responsibility ends 
and where the Rwandan government's responsibility begins. Addi-
tionally, an unlimited temporal mandate would have further congested 
the already slow [CTR process, possibly preventing important leaders 
of the 1994 genocide from going to trial. On the other hand, the Rwandan 
government has criticized the limited jurisdiction for failing to cover 
most of the planning period for the genocide, and has argued that a tri-
bunal "which refuses to consider the causes of the genocide in Rwanda 
and its planning ... will not contribute to eradicating the culture of 
impunity or creating a clinlate conducive to national reconciliation:'1l5 
Interestingly, the limited jurisdiction now allows the Rwandan govern-
ment to avoid being held accountable for many of the violations of 
humanitarian law that observers say have occurred since 1994.'" These 
include not just reprisal killings in Rwanda, but massacres that have 
occurred in Rwandan-controlled areas of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo since J994.87 The failure to hold the RPF and other Tutsis account-
able will be discussed in more detail below. 
Anoth!'r frustrated expectation for the Rwandan government cen-
ters on the ICTR's refusal to impose the death p!'nalty. The government 
has disagreed with the tribunal's sentencing possibilities for two rea-
sons. First, because the lCTR Statute forbade capital punishment, those 
being tried for the most egregious crimes in Arusha faced lesser sen-
tences than those being tried for lesser crimes in Rwanda, where the 
death penalty was available. Second, some of those convicted by the 
ICTR were expected to serve their sentences in Europe. gg As one RPF 
official remarked, "It doesn't fit our definition of justice to think of the 
authors of the Rwandan genocide sitting in a full-service Swedish prison 
with a television."" A third reason, not officially articulated by the 
Rwandan government, but suspected by several Rwanda observers, is 
that the sentencing disparity seems hypocritical to the Rwandan 
government; the same international community that sat by and let the 
85. Sec ICTR ESIABLlSP'MENT, supra note 2 (statement of Manzi Bakuramutsa), 
86. See DES FORGES, supra note 21 (describing RPF killings of persons sus-
pected to have been involved in the genocide, after the fighting hnd ended).; 
Christina M. CarroJI, An As:-e5sment 0./ the Role and Effectiveness (.1 the lnterllational 
Crimina! Tribunal for Rwanda and the RUHmdan National Jusfice System in Dealing 
witll ti,e Mass Alrocitirs of 1994. IS B.U. ["T'L 1....1. 163, 175-76 (2000). 
87. See e.g.~ Chris McGreal, Genocide Tribuna! Ready to Indict FirM Tui.;;is, 
GCARDL'" (LONDON), Apr. 5, 2002, at 16. 
88. Denmark, Norway, and Belgium, as weB as a few African countries, 
offered to incarcerate those (onvicted at the ICTR. See TCTR, International 
Cooperation 'with the Tribanal, FACT SHEET No.6, available at http://www.ictr.org. 
89, GOCREVlTCHt supra note 1, at 255. 
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genocide unfold now takes the moral high ground about how the death 
penalty violates international human rights norms.90 
Rwanda has also been largely disappointed by the actual perform-
ance of the ICTR. First, the ICTR has been seen as unnecessarily slow; 
the Rwandan government does not want the quest for "deluxe justice" 
to corne at the expense of urgency.91 Second, Rwanda has been frustrated 
by episodes of procedural bungling that resulted in suspects being 
released. For a time in late 1999, Rwanda had neither an ambassador 
nor a permanent representative at the ICTR. This resulted from a rift 
over the release of a particularly notorious prisoner, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza, who was released following some procedural irregulari-
ties." That situation was finally remedied in 2000, when the ICTR agreed 
to reconsider its decision, and Barayagwiza now awaits trial in Arusha,93 
But the Rwandan government remains concerned that "[t]he perform-
ance of the tribunal thus far has been disappointing," citing such fac-
tors as poor tribunal organizational structure, incompetent tribunal 
personnel, and tribunal leadership that shows a perceived "hostility 
towards cooperation with the Government of Rwanda" in making its 
assessment." Third, the Rwandan government remains frustrated by 
the cost of the proceedings at the ICTR, seeing large sums of money dis-
pensed on relatively few cases. As the government noted in a report 
published in 2001, the Rwandan national system could have achieved 
more "if the international community had put at our disposal resource[s] 
of the magnitude that has for example been squandered on the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda."95 Rwandans feel that the 
ICTR has never realized its initial promise to efficiently conduct and 
conclude high-profile criminal trials. 
90. Jose Alvarez, Crimes of State, Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 
YALE J. INT'L L 365, 407 (1999). 
91. Official Website of the Rwandan Government, GENOCTDE, at 
http://www.rwandal.com/gov [hereinafter RWANDA!\" GOVERNMENT]. 
92. See Chris Simpson, Rwanda Tribunal's Shaky Progress, available at 
http:// news.bbc.co. uk/hi/ english/ world/ africa/ newsid_645000 / 645070.stm 
(Feb. 16,2000) (last visited Apr. 1, 2002). This article and the incident sparked 
by Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza's release illustrate the Rwandan government's con-
cern that the ICTR and western observers value the rights of defendants over 
those of the victims. 
93. See id. 
94. Official web site of the Rwandan Embassy in the United States, THE 
JUDICIAL SYSTE\11:.J RWANDA: A REPORT ON JUSTlCE, at http://www.rwandaemb.org/ 
justice/justice.htm (last visited on July 14, 2002) [herehwfter JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN 
RWANDA]. 
95. See RJ,.VANDAN RESPONSE TO A~NESTY I:';TERNATTO,"AL, supra note 73. 
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Finally, the tribunal', inaccessibility also complicates the average 
Rwandan's relationship with the lCTR. The lCTR's location in Arusha 
makes it difficult for Rwandans to attend court proceedings or hear news 
of [CTR trials. The international community located the tribunal in a 
neutral country to enhance the appearance of impartiality and fairness, 
but that decision only exacerbated Rwanda's feelings that the nation 
was being denied justice. The Rwandan Ambassador to the Security 
Council noted in voting against the ICTR Statute that it was deeply 
important for the tribunal to be located in Rwanda so that Rwandans 
could see up close what it means to fight against impunity; this lesson 
was lost by situating the tribunal in Arusha. Only recently have 
Rwandans been able to get news from the lCTR in Kinyarwanda, the 
national language of Rwanda." Although the Rwandan Government 
has acknowledged certain lCTR successes, it is dear that its overall sense 
of ICTR performance is negative." 
Popular sentiment toward the ICTR is no different. When ICTR Chief 
Prosecutor Carla del Ponte traveled to Kigali in Tune 2002, she was met 
with protests from 3,500 genocide survivors marching with placards 
inscribed, """0 justice from TCTR"'" This sentiment is best and most con-
sistently articulated by a group called lBUKA, which is the principal 
Rwandan organization for survivors of the genocide. IBUKA has been 
critical of the pace of the ICTR proceedings; their view is that the slow 
pace diminishes the value of the justice that is served.'" Victims' groups 
also protest certain procedures like fee-splitting between defense coun-
sels and their clients, whereby defense lawyers share some of their remu-
neration with their clients so that they will continue to be retained as 
96, For example,. in 2000, the ICTR undertook a major outreach program 
towards Rwanda. A reporter from Radio Rwanda was pennanently based at the 
ICTR to broadcast daily reports from the trial chambers. He also traveled to The 
Hague to report on an appellate proceeding. See Sixth Annual Report of the 
lnternational Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Genocide and Other SerioLls Violations of International Humanitarian Law in 
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Such Violations Committed In the Territory of Neighboring States Between 
Tanuary 1, and December 31, 1994, 56th Sess., LS. Doc. AI56!351-S/200l /863, 
available at http://www.ictr.org{lastvisited Apr. L 2002), 
9T See JUOICIAL SYSTEM IN R'YVANOA, supra note 94. 
98, Gene",ide Survivors DemonsTrale Against lCTR Chief, TRTN (J une 28, 2002), 
available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printableI200206280543,html (last vis-
ited Aug, 2, 2002) {hereinafter GcnocirJe Survivors Demonstrate], 
99. Stef Vandeginste, Rwanda: Dealing with Getlocide and Crimes Against 
Humanity in the Context of Armed Cor~fiict and Failed PoWica! Tnmsitiotl , in BERY-
ING TIlE PAST: MAKlNC:; PEACE AND Doe\JG JUSTICE AFTER elVH. CONFUL'T, at 31 C\igeJ 
BIggar ed" 2001). 
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lawyers,lOO They view this practice as unjustly enriching suspected gena-
ddaires whiJe they await triaLltL 
International opinion of the lCTR is more positive, Although schol-
ars recognize that many of Rwanda's complaints about delays and poor 
management are valid, the lCTR has nevertheless achieved a remark-
able number of high-level indictments and convictions. Moreover, in the 
painstaking accumulation of evidence prepared for trial, the ICTR has 
amassed inlpressive documentation of many of the worst acts of geno-
cide in Rwanda, The ICTR therefore goes far toward meeting one goal 
expressed at its creation: international recognition of the scope of crimes 
against humanity that occurred in Rwanda in 1994, These positive 
achievements of the ICTR, howe,'er, seem to be directed more at the 
international community than at Rwanda; where the Rwandans gener~ 
ally feel disconnected from the justice being meted out in Arusha, the 
international community senses the establishment of important prece-
dents for international human rights law102 111is difference in approach 
to the ICTR's record is understandable given the seemingly subtle dif-
ference in goals elaborated at the IcrR's formation: in addition to seek-
ing justice by holding perpetrators accountable, Rwanda wanted an 
emphasiS on the deterrent effect within Rwanda, while the international 
community was more concerned with the ICTR's potential impact on 
human rights world"\\'ide.1d3 
One particularly serious criticism of the lCTR is only recently ris-
ing to the fore, namely the tribunal's inability to prosecute Tutsis who 
are accused of committing war crimes, Although the tribunal's mandate 
encoDlpasses prosecution ot crimes against humanity conlmitted by both 
100. Rwanda; Rejormslntrodllced ilt lhe International Criminal Tribunal, IRIN 
(july 9, 2002), 
101. Genocide Survivors DemOtlstratc .. sUfna note 98; Betsy Pisik, Frustration 
in Rwanda, \VA5H. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at AJ4, 
102, Vandeginste, supra note 99, at 230-31 (2001), 
103. In the statements accompanying the establishment of the ICTR, fDT 
example, Ambassador Hannay of the United Kingdom emphasized the global 
aspect of the crimes that were committed in Rwanda, arguing that the "'human 
rjghts violations committed in Rwanda ... concerned the international com-
munity as a whole" and he situated the need for justice and "deterrence for the 
future" in this area of international concern, See lCTR ESTAl1-LlSHME-l.JT, supra note 
2 (Statement of Da\'id Hannay of the United Kingdom), By contrast, Ambassador 
Bakuramutsa of Rwanda acknmvledged that the international-.:ommunity had 
important interests in the prosecution of those accused of committing genocide~ 
but his statement is replete 'with the very particular needs and concerns for jus~ 
tiee, deterrence, and reconciliation within Rwanda itself. See TeTR ESTABUSE-
! ... lENT, supra note 2 (Statement of Manzi Bakuramutsa of Rwanda); see also the 
discussion of Ambassador Bakuramutsa's concerns, supra Section C.I. 
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Hutu and Tutsi, in reality only Hutu suspects have been brought before 
the ICTR. Prosecutor Del Ponte announced her intention to investigate 
suspected Tutsi war criminals in 2001, but as yet she has issued no indict-
ments. lO' According to Del Ponte, Rwandan President Paul Kagame-
head of the RPF in 1994-has "not delivered on a pledge to cooperate."1D' 
This stalemate again raises the specter of "victor's justice," a specler thaI 
would counteract all the eiforts being made to dismantle the culture of 
impunity in Rwanda. 
Because the ICTR as constituted cannot meet all the goals Rwanda 
has for post-genocide accountability, and because the ICTR handles only 
a small number 01 cases, the Rwandan national judicial system, which 
handles the vast majority of genocide trials, plays a critical role in the 
long-term process of eliminating the cycle of impunity and violence. 
D. NATIONAljUDlCIAl RESPONSE 
Despite the existence of the ICTR, the Rwandan national judicial 
system has borne and will continue to bear the brunt of the genocide 
trials. Because of its resource limitations and limited mandate, the ICTR 
ultimately cannot resolve the grim situation in Rwanda-its processes 
take too long and its resources are too limited. 'l;loreover, the United 
States and other nations have mentioned the need for an "endgame strat-
egy" for the ad hoc war crimes tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia."~ 
It seems highly unlikely that the genocide trials will be finished before 
the ICTR is disbanded. When that occurs, the Rwandan system will go 
forward alone. 
Most important for Rwanda, the ICTR's goals are more interna-
tionally focused, aimed in part at deterring leaders in other nations from 
carrying out similar campaigns of violence. Rwanda's goals! as noted 
above, place much more emphasis upon achieving justice inside Rwanda, 
and upon the deterrent effect wit/lin Rwanda and the importance of 
breaking down Rwanda's culture of impunity. For this reason, even an 
JCTR with infinite capacity and resources could not play the role that 
the Rwandan legal system must play to achieve this ultimate goal. 
104. See Marc Lacey, Tribunal Says R,vondll Is Stalling Inquiry Info 1994 KiUirrgs, 
N.Y. TTMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at A3. 
105. Chris McCreal, Genocide Tribunal Ready to Indict First Tutsis, GUARDIA:\l 
(LOMJON), Apr. 5, 2002, al16. 
106. See Hirondelle Foundation, US PushiJlg Closure Strategyfor UN Triblll1a!s, 
Says E!1'tJoH, avaiiabk fit http://www.hirondeHe,org/hirondellc.nsf/ (last visited 
Mar, 17, 2002) (discussing remarks made by U.S, Ambassador for \'Var Crimes 
Issues Pierre Richard Prosper, suggesting that the [CTR should wind down by 
20()7 or 2(08). 
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1. Background and Goals 
The 1994 genocide left Rwandan legal institutions, like the rest of 
civil society, in tatters, Rwanda's most urgent problems arise from its 
limited human and physical capacity to address the massive legal chal-
lenges posed by the genOCide. The statistics on Rwanda's diminished 
post-genocide legal capacity are grim. Two-thirds of Rwanda's judges 
and attorneys fled or were killed during the months of fighting, leaving 
the country largely devoid of experts on the lawl(J7 Law enforcement 
mechanisms such as the police force ceased to exist for a time following 
the genocidewb The system lacks both trained investigators (only 39 
were left after the genocide, compared to 193 before)li)9 and the resources 
needed to pursue investigations, especially in rural areas.1I0 The lack of 
staff capacity and resources for the legal system means that the trials of 
those accused of genocide have proceeded at a glacial pace. As of March 
2001, the most recent month for which figures are available, onlv 5,310 
trials had been completed. III By the Rwandan government's most recent 
estimate, it would take 200 years to prosecute all those accused of genD-
cide if the courts maintained their current speed. ll2 
The second capacity problem is that of the overwhelmed jail facili-
ties. As of 2001, 106,000 indIviduals remained incarcerated on genocide 
charges in jails with an official capacity of only 30,OOO.1Il The terrible 
conditions created by such overcrowding have been the subject of many 
complaints by human rights organizations;114 as one international 
observer described the Kigali prison, "the prison revealed wall-to-wall 
people, with the prisoner hierarchy determined by those who had to 
stand, those who could sil, those who could lie down, and those who 
could lie down in the shade."lI5ln 2001, 708 detainees died in prison as 
a result of these conditions. Amnesty International has reported that 
107. JCDICIAL SYSTEM IN RWANDA, supra note 94. 
108, Id 
109. Id, 
110. Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Pastcof~flid Transitions: A Social 
Scientist's Perspective on thE African Case, 95 AM, J. INTL L 64 (2001), 
111. Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 2002: Rwanda. 
HunulI/ Rights Developmcnt~, available (It http://hrw,org/wr2k2/africa9,html Oast 
visited Aug. 2, 2002) [herelnafter HRWatch 2002]. 
112. See R\.'\"A~DA!\ GOVERNMENT, supra note 91. 
11.3. UNITED STATES DEP:\RTMENTOF STATE, CoU\iTRY REPORT or-,; HUMAK RJGHTS 
PRACTlCES. RWANDA (2001) [hereinafter STATE DEPARTME:-JT 2001 HC\'{AN RIGHTS 
REPORT]' 
114, See HRWatch 2002, supra note Ill. 
115, Peter H. Sennett Working with Rwanda 1bward the Dom£stic PrvseclJtior. 
oj Genocide Crimes, 12 51. JOH~'S J. LEGAL CO~·lME.sT" 425, 438 (1997), 
., 
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these conditions amount to "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment"H6 
The overwhelmed jail facilities combined with the slow pace of the tri-
als raises important due process concerns for defendants. 
Rwanda's goal since 1994 has been to rebuild its capacity so that it 
can move expeditiously to bring these thousands to justice. The geno-
cide trials permit the Rwandan government to dispense justice by indi-
vidualizing culpability for the genocide. Instead of treating all Hutus as 
guilty, the trials allow those who participated in the genOcide to be 
brought to justice, and those who did not participate to be exonerated 
in the eyes of the state and, more important, in the eyes of the commu-
nities where they have had to live for years under clouds of suspicion. 
Convinced that the ICTR is located too far away to help teach Rwandans 
about justice and accountability, the Rwandan government also hopes 
to provide a sound model of accountability at home. Although the tri-
als are situated within and are an integral part of the government's 
broader effort to achieve reconciliation, this particular aspect of the legal 
response to genocide exclusively emphasizes individual accountability 
and specific deterrence for those convicted. 
2. Jurisdiction and Procedures of the Rwandan National Courts 
Rwanda had no dom<'stic genocide law prior to the events of 1994, 
although it had previously ratified the U.N. Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. J17 Thus, the country estab-
lished an entirely neW substantiv<, and procedural framework ex post 
facto. with all the practical, political and legal problems such an approach 
entails. On August 30, 1996, Rwanda adopted the Organic Law on the 
Organization of Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting the Crime of 
Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed Since October 1, 
1990.''' The 1996 law divided genOCide-related crimes into four cate-
gories, Category One covers the most serious criminals; including I'plan_ 
ners, organizers# instigators, supervisors, and leaders of the crime of 
genocide or of a crime against humanity," those who acted from posi-
tions of power to foster the genocide, "notorious murderers who by 
virtue of zeal or excessive malice" stood apart from the average partic-
ipant in the killings, and individuals who committed acts of sexual 
116. TROCBLED COUI{SE OF JUSTICE, supra note 75. 
117. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, U.!\:.TS. No. 1021, Vol. 78 at 277 (1951) (defining genocide a"d lay-
ing out a series of punishable acts). 
118. See Rwandan Genocide Law? supra note 65 . 
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torture.!" Category Two consists of individuals who perpetrated or con-
spired to con1mlt intentional homicide or serious assault ending in 
death. "" Category Three deals with persons who committed U other seri-
ous assaults. "12J Category Four is reserved for those who committed 
offenses against property.122 
All of the trials of persons charged under the Organic Law are con-
ducted in the regular Rwandan judiCIal system; the government decided 
against creating special bodies to handle genocide trials. m The Rwandan 
courts use a civil law system, which has two primary implications for 
how the trials of suspectedgenocidaires are conducted. First in civil law 
trials, the prosecution is not obliged to put witnesses for the prosecu-
tion on the stand for cross-examina hon. Instead; witnesses provide writ-
ten statements in advance, and defendants may specifically request that 
a witness appear for cross-examination. The Rwandan government 
believes that one merit of this system is that it helps judges move through 
any given case more qUickly than if all testimony had to be offered in 
person in front of the cour!.'" Second, in the civil!aw system, the judge 
has more discretion to determine what evidence should be submitted at 
trial; such discretion is consistent with penal codes in France and Belgium, 
which also emphasize the discretion of the judge. l25 
The Rwandan courts have introduced two innovations to move 
through the backlog of cases. The first innovation is the introduction of 
the plea bargain, which had not preViously existed in Rwanda. Chapter 
III of the Rwandan Genocide Law sets forth a plea-bargaining system 
whereby perpetrators can receive reduced sentences in exchange for 
guilty pleas, a measure that aims to reduce the backlog of cases. l26 The 
introduction of the plea-bargaining system was contentious in Rwanda, 
traditionally a civil law nation where plea-bargaining was seen as a for-
eign, common law practice.'" The guilty pleas ran counter to the deep 
passions accompanying the prosecution of each crime; the efficiency 
gains were directly countered by a sense that people were recei\>ing less 




123. RWA:\"DAN RESPONSE TO A\1:'\lP:S1Y I:'JIERNATlON;L, supra note 73. 
124. Id. 
125. ld. 
126. Rwandan Genocide Law, supra note 63, art. 2. See also Sennett. supm 
note 115. 
127. See Lawyers Committee for Human Hights, Prosecuting Genocide in 
Rwanda: The ICTR and NaJional Trials 50~51 (July 1997) rMost traditional civil 
law systems did not allow plea-bargaining and some viewed it as distasteful if 
not immoral."}. 
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than full justice,US However! this controversy may be somewhat miti-
gated because Chapter III's leniency is forbidden to individuals whose 
alleged crimes fall within the most serious Category One acts. 12' 
The second innovation is the Gisovu project, a release program that 
seeks to achieve faster justice for many of those in detention. The Gisovu 
project focuses on detainees who have no files, and on elderly or ill pris-
oners, among others. Starting in late 2000, prosecutors accompany these 
detainees and prisoners to their home communities. where the prose-
cutors ask if anyone has testimony against them. If no one comes for-
ward with any testimony, the suspects are freed. DO Among those who 
are investigated through the Gisovu project, between 30 percent and 40 
percent are released. 1-31 
3. Achievements and Remaining Challenges 
Since 1994, the Rwandan government, with the help of international 
aid, has made great efforts to increase its number of qualified judicial 
personnel and improve the bask office infrastructure for all of the coun-
try's trial and appellate courts. According to a study released by the 
Rwandan Embassy in the United States, the overall number of judicial 
personnel such as judges, prosecutors, investigators and others is now 
higher than it was before 1994,132 An increase in judicial personnel, how-
ever, is only a partial indicator of the efficacy and fairness of the Rwandan 
judicial system. Domestic trials began in December 1996, and the num-
ber of trials has increased in each subsequent year, but more than 100,000 
individuals remain in jails around the country.1" Only 5,300 trials had 
concluded as of May 2001, which is only 5 percent of the total docket. 
Another 1,335 prisoners have been released through the Gisovu project 
as of May 2001. 134 The plea-bargain innovation has been less effident 
than anticipated because each confession must be examined for valid-
ity before the prosecutor can move forward with Chapter 1lI leniency. 
With some 15,000 persons having confessed (a little more than 10 per-
cent of the total in detention), even this device will take time to imple-
ment, and will only reduce the backlog of caseS to around 90,000 
128. See Sennett, supra note 115. 
129. Rwandan Genocide La\'\', supra note 65, art 3. 
130. HRWatch 2002, supra note 111. 
131. STATE DEPAIUMEI'.j2001 HL1viAN RIGHTS REPGRT, supra note 113, at §l(d). 
132. ]UDlCIAL SYSTEM If',; R'i.\'Af',;DA, supra note 94. 
133. STATE DEPAtnMENT 2001 HeM"" RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 113. 
134. ld. 
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suspects."'" Despite the real progress that has been made in strengthen-
ing legal capacity in the country, the challenge posed in absolute terms 
by these high numbers remains almost the same as it was in 1994. 
4. Effectiveness of the Rwandan Courts 
[n the early days following the genocide, observers sharply criti-
cized Rwandan courts for failing to afford proper procedural protec-
tions to defendants, and they feared that the domestic courts would be 
used as illegitimate tools of victor's justice rather than appropriately 
constituted and impartial courts of law. The early genocide trials were 
held inconspicuously, to avoid western attention to procedural defi-
ciencies like lack of defense counsel, poor quality of investigations, and 
speedy judgments that bordered on hastiness Llh At the same time, until 
international help came forth, this slluation was caused more by prac-
tical and logistical problems than by any lack of commitment to due 
process. Given the Rwandan judicial system's miserable situation imme· 
diotely following the genocide, little more could be expected. 
Portions or the international con1munity continue to monitor and 
criticize the Rwandan legal system's response to the genocide. Human 
rights groups regularly issue scathing reports condemning Rwanda's 
treatment of its prisoners and the Rwandan trial process.'" In 2000, 
Amnesty International released a report, The Troubled Course of Justice, 
which harshly criticized six elements of Rwanda's legal system: deten· 
tion without trial; re-arrest of suspected genocidaires after formal acquit-
tal in the courts; overcrowded, inhuman jail conditions; torture and 
ill·treatment; unlawful detention of civilians in military custody; and 
imposition of the death penalty.;38 Amnesty also noted that even in tri-
als where defendants had attorneys and more opportunities to prepare 
their defenses, standards of fairness and procedure varied widely 
between defendants, with more prominent defendants often receiving 
better treatment than indigent and uneducated individuals. '39 
135, HRWatch 2002# supra note ltl. As this book went to press~ several thou-
sand prisoners were released, pending their appearance at gacaca trials, dis-
cussed in Section E, infra. This brings the number of genocide suspects in 
Rwandan prisons down to roughly 80,000 persons. See Rwanda; Thousands l~f 
Genocide Suspects Released from SoUdarify Cat1lp~1 HIRONDEllE Nn','s AGENCY, May 
6,2003. 
136. GOUREVIH.':H, supra note L at 343-44. 
137, See e.g., TROt:BlED COURSE OF Jt:STICEj supra note 75; HRWatch 2002, supra 
note 111; HUMAN RIGHTS \AlATCH, VVORLO REPORT 2001 RWAt-.:OA, HUMA~ RIGHTS 
DEVELOPMEN1S, amilabie al http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl / africa/rwanda.hlml (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2002). 
138. TRO\.;BLED COC"HSE OF JUSTICE, supra note 75. 
139. See id. 
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The Rwandan government readily and regretfully admits that its trial 
system still has problems. It acknowledges !hat "[j]udidal institutions in 
Rwanda have at the best of times been ineffective, run by poorly paid 
and ill trained personnel. At worst, these institutions have been partisan 
and corrupt, staffed with many political appointees eager to please the 
powers that be, the highest bidder, or both.""o This self-criticism is an 
encouraging sign, as it shows the possibility that the post-genocide gov-
ernment is willing to establish a system that values accountability for alL 
not just for its political opponents. The government consistently asks the 
international community, however, to carefully consider the broader con-
text in which these institutions are operating. In its response to Amnesty 
International's Troubled Course of fuslice Report, the government com-
ments that the international community "proceeds on the assumption 
that the same standards which apply in states wi!h abundant resources 
and limited number of criminal suspects should equally apply to a coun-
try like Rwanda with limited resources and an almost insurmountable 
problem of having to render justice for around 100,000 suspects now in 
custody awaiting triaL"l41 The government's view is that the interna-
tional community should adjust its standards enough to be realistic about 
Rwanda's still weak legal capacity. 
The dialogue between the government of Rwanda and human rights 
groups helps focus attention on the ways in which the Rwandan national 
judicial system can continue to be improved. On balance, however, the 
Rwandan government has gone a long way toward achieving its goals. 
The legal infrastructure is substantially impro\'ed from its 1994 condi-
tion, and as the United States Department of State has stated in each of 
its j'luman Rights reports from 1999 through 2002, the "vast majority" 
of genocide trials meet international standards.!" Rwanda is therefore 
starting to provide a visible model of accountability at home, meeting 
one of its critical objectives. 
One serious unaddressed concern remains, ho¥,reverf and that is the 
question of whether it is "victor's justice" that is being pursued in 
Rwanda. The Organic Law permits prosecution of all crimes arising after 
140. J"C:JTCH.L SY'STB11:'\1 [{W~'\I:JA, suprn note 94 (further arguing that "[t]he 
absence of competent impartial and independenl judicial organs in post inde-
pendence Rwanda is one of the factors thal have contributed significantly to 
foster the culture of impunity that led to the 1994 genocide"). 
J41. Sec RWA.'1DAl'\ RESPO:-';SETO At,,1NESTY I:\ITER:\IATIOl\:AL, 5upra note 73. 
14-2. Sef STATE DEPT 2001 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 113; UNITED 
STATES DEPARTMENT OF COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES; 
RWA.>JDA, at § l(d) (2000); UNITED STATES DEPART\.{EKT OF STATE, COU;\iTRY RbPOfIT 
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the RPF invasion of Rwanda in 1990143 The RPF itself has been accused 
of (and admitted to) crimes against humanity during the civil war and 
its aftermath, but those responsible have not been called before the judi-
cial system to account for their crimes. As the Rwandan government 
becomes increasingly implicated in human rights abuses conducted by 
its forces and allies in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.''' this 
lack of accountability goes from being worrisome to being absolutely 
counter to the goal of eradicating the culture of impunity. The unwill-
ingness to hold itself to the same standards it demands of others is char-
acteristic of previous regimes, both Hutu and Tutsi, whose actions built 
mistrust, fear, and hatred instead of tolerance and inclusion. If the 
Rwandan government remains committed to its original goal of eradi-
cating the culture of impunity in Rwanda, then it must change its 
approach in this area. 
Notwithstanding this remaining untackled issue of "victor's jus-
tice," the real achievements of the Rwandan justice system merit con-
tinued international community support, both finandal and technical. 
International aid should continue to finance capacity-building projects 
that focus on all levels of the judiciary from the investigators to the 
judges, as well as projects that provide legal counsel to indigent defen-
dants. Even with this support, however, the Rwandan government is 
unlikely to be able to satisfactorily respond to the international com-
munity's concerns. if the courts focus on being thorough, they will be 
unable to address the concern for moving through the enormous vol-
ume of cases facing the courts and would pose particular dangers to 
those who may be innocent but who are presently detained. Likewise, 
if the courts focus on speed, they would generate fundamental due 
process conCerns for most of thuse accused. Indeed, any justice system 
with such a backlog of cases would find the task of providing speedy 
but thorough justice Herculean.!" This situation presents a strong case 
for an alternative means of finding justice. Rwanda's chosen alternative 
is the gacaca process, the innovative third arm of the tripartite legal 
response to genocide. 
--........... -
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E. GACACA 
Faced with an overwhelming judicial caseload and a large number 
of suspects in prison awaiting trials that may never come f Rwanda 
recently implemented a system of community-based justice called gacaca. 
Gacaca is modeled after a traditional community conflict-resolution mech-
anism with the same name, ,vhich loosely translates from Kinyanvanda 
as "justice on the grass."146 Traditionally, gacaea was used to settle land 
disputes. In post-genocide Rwanda, the new version of gacaca will be 
used to try individuals charged with crimes in Categories Two, Three 
and Four, with some level of court supervision. Category One offenses 
will remain in the national courts.147 
The gacaea process meets two urgent needs not met by either the 
ICTR or the national judicial process: speed and inclusiveness. The need 
for speed responds directly to the lengthy detentions of suspected geno-
eidaires and to the overcrowded jail conditions. The need for inclusive-
ness responds to the ineffectiveness of both the ICTR and the national 
genocide trials in engaging individuals and communities in the work of 
reconciliation. Although gacaca is still in its early stages, it promises to 
complement the existing international and national accountability mech-
anisms responding to the genOCide. 
1. Background and Goals 
Rwanda has two principal goals for the gaeaca process.!48 First, the 
government hopes gacaea will speed case resolution, lowering the eco-
nomic impact of the trials on the country's limited finances and mini-
mizing criticism by the international human rights groups who oppose 
its past and current treatment of prisoners.149 Second, and more impor-
tant, the government of Rwanda hopes gacaea will help attain reconcil-
iation between Hutu and Tutsi f and between victims and genocidaires, in 
a way that the ICTR and the national judicial system have thus far failed 
to do. l50 As noted above, the Rwandan government was frustrated by 
refugees/torchlight/newsletter /newslet_si1.htm. As in Rwanda, the needs for 
speed and for thoroughness compete directly with each other. 
146. Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 
INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 73, 175 (2001). 
147. See RWA~DAN GOVERNME.:-.JT, supra note 91. 
148. See generally, Peter Nantu1ya, The Gacaca System in Rwanda (2001), avail-
able at http://www.accord.org.za/. 
149. Id.; see also RWANDA~ GOVERNMENT, supra note 91. 
150. See RWA 'JDAt-.; GOVERNMENT, supra note 91. 
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the decision to locate the TCTR in Arusha, where its lessons about account-
ability would be removed from the people of Rwanda. Likewise, the pace 
of the trials in the national judicial system and the terrible ongoing sit-
uation with the overcrowded prisons have done little to instill popular 
trust in ao:ountability mechanisms. By contrast, the gacaca trials will take 
place in and involve the communities where atrocities were committed, 
and the trials will be held in front of those most directly affected-the 
victims, the families of victims, and the communities for whom recon-
ciliation is not an abstract goal but a constant daily struggle. 
Despite the prominent language about reconciliation in Rwandan 
references to gaeaea, the new system also purposefully retains a ret-
ributive element. The community ownership of the process is geared 
toward reconciliation along the model of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC). But unlike the TRC defendants who 
come before the gacaca may receive prison sentences even when they 
confess. The system was explicitly chosen over a wide-spread amnesty 
system or investigative body because Rwanda did not want to relin-
quish its emphasis on individual accountabilitylSI 
The Rwandan government's embrace of the gacaca also asserts the 
primacy of its own traditions over those imposed by the international 
community in the early days following the genOCide. Unhappy with the 
performance of the ICTR, the government hopes that this innately 
Rwandan process will join all Rwandans in the work of rebuilding the 
culture of law in Rwanda. 
2. The Gacaca Process 
Rwanda passed its law governing the gacaca process in January 
2001.''' Rwandans elected 200,000 gacaea judges in October 2001 and 
began training these judges in April 2002, eight years after the geno-
cide beganlS3 The judges must be "persons of integrity," but they are 
not required to have any prior legal training or experience. Cacnea 
judges take responsibility for the fairness and orderliness of proceed-
151. Peter t;vin, The Introduction of a lvfodemized Gacaca for Judgirlg Suspects 
of Participtltion iu the Genocide and Ihe ,\1assacrcs oj 1994 in RI.t:anda: A Discussion 
Paper Prepared for the Belgian Secretary of State far Dewlopmenl Coopemtio,' (2001), 
available at http;/lw\\'\.\f.macconsortium.org!ITV/2oo1 /Uvin.gacaca .report.htm. 
152. See Organic Law on GaeDea, Organic Law No. 40/2000 (2001) [here-
inafter GACACA LAwj, 
153. See Hirondelle Foundation, Training of Gaeaea ludges Sfarts 8 April 2002, 
available 01 http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondelle/nsf/ (Apr. 3, 2002) (last vis-
ited May 22, 2002). 
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ings. Caeaea's Assembly, which consists of all inhabitants of the com-
munity over 18 years of age, holds the task of identifying which crimes 
will be prosecuted and who will be accused of those crimes. The duties 
of the General Assembly also include creating lists of those who died, 
those who were raped, and those who moved away, and gathering evi-
dence which incriminates or exonerates those who have been accused 
of participating in the genocide l54 At the higher levels of gaeaca, the 
General Assemblies consist of elected representatives from these local 
assemblies. ISS 
Gacaca courts are organized on levels that reflect the Rwandan admin-
istrative structure, with authority and jurisdiction allocated over four 
increasingly large territorial areas: cell, sector, district and province. 
Cacaea courts at the most local level, the celt will try only prisoners and 
suspects accused of Category Four crimes {property damage and van-
dalism)IS6 Sector-level courts will try Category Three offenses, while 
district-level courts will try Category Two offenses and appeals from 
Category Three cases. The province-level courts will handle appeals 
from district-level decisions. Those accused of Category One offenses 
cannot use the gacaca process; these most serious cases remain in the 
national judicial system. 
Caeaea trials look very different from those taking place in the lCTR 
and the national judicial system.!S7 In a gacaca trial, the defendant has no 
lawyer and faces a judge who is also the prosecutor. The trial takes place 
in the community where the crime allegedly took place, in front of a 
crowd that would normally include the victim and/or the victim's fam-
ily and friends. When the judge reads the charges against the defendant, 
the defendant is allowed to respond with his or her version of the events 
in question, and may call upon witnesses from the assembled commu-
nity to verify his or her story. If no one in the community has any evi-
dence against the defendant, then the defendant is freed. The defendant 
may also enter a guilty plea to reduce his or her sentence. As in the 
national judicial system, this introduction of the guilty plea has provoked 
controversy. Given the number of years some of these defendants have 
already been in jail awaiting trial. the reduced sentence they receive by 
pleading guilty means that many of them will be freed immediately. 
The gacaea process began on a pilot basis in May 2001, with seven 
trials of suspects who had been detained in prison for more than four 
154. See RWAl\DAN GOVERl\MENT, supra note 9l. 
155. ld. 
156. See GACACA LAW, supra note 152. 
157. See generally, Nantulya, supra note 148; Uvin, supra note 151. 
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years)" In the case of one IS-year-old, the judge read the charges and 
asked the community for their evidence. After the judge's request was 
met three times with silence, the defendant was freed. Another defen-
dant was accused of participating in the killing, and several women 
spoke up against her after the charges were read. The judge warned 
them that they needed to be able to produce evidence, and that false tes-
timony was a serious offense. The defendant was taken back to jail, and 
her case will be handled in a later (non-pilot) gacaca session.159 In all, 
four people were released that day, and the other cases were postponed 
until the official process began in 2002. 
By the time all courts are operational, there will be n,ooo gacaca 
courts throughout Rwanda, involving more than 250,000 judges.!bO In 
the meantime, 73 garaca courts in 11 provinces have begun their duties.!'! 
The first task for the gacaca courts is developing the list of genocide vic-
tims and suspected perpetrators; this list will be the basis for the actual 
trials scheduled to commence in late 2002. As of August 2002, the process 
remains popular with genocide survivors, and with prisoners and their 
families.'62 Some troubles have arisen as to whether crimes committed 
by the Rwandan Patriotic Front should also be brought before the gacaca 
courts; this issue has not been resolved as of October 2002.'63 
It would be a mistake to think of gacaca as an entirely traditional 
legal mechanism. Although the process has its roots in the older com-
munity-based conflict resolution mechanism whose name it has adopted, 
the post-genocide gacaca has been initiated and will be administered by 
the state, and will use the coercive power of the state to imprison both 
those who are found guilty of genocide-related crimes and those who 
are found guilty of offering false evidence against the defendants. 
Moreover, unlike the traditional gacaca which was contained within indi-
vidual communities; the modern variant moves into larger and larger 
administrative units as defendants lodge appeals and as the seriousness 
of the charges increases. 1M 
158. See Mary Kimani, Cormnrmity Frees Four Genocide Suspects During Pilot 
Gacaca Justice Process, Internews Network Reporting from the [eTR (2001), avail-
able at http://www.intemews.org I activities I ICTR_ reporIs/ICTR_"'ports_may200l. 
him. 
159. See id. 
160. See Herve Bar, Watchdog Criticises Rwanda's Village Courts, AGE:-.!CF. 
FRANCE PRESSE (Aug. 23, 2002). 
161. Hirondelle Foundation, Le Lent Decol/age des Gameo (Oct. 1,2002), ami/-
able at http://www.hirondelle.org/hirondeUe.nsfl. 
162. See Bar, ;;;upra note 160, 
163. HiTOndelle Foundati()n, supra note 16l. 
164. See generally Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Eledwl!s May Speed Genocide 
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3. Hopes and Concerns 
The Rwandan government and people have enormous hopes for the 
gacaea process, seeing it as the practical and philosophical answer to 
what has been missing in the lCTR and national judicial trials. The prac-
tical hope is that gacaea trials will expedite the judicial process. The 
greater philosophical hope is that by engaging Rwandans in the act of 
holding individuals accountable for spedfk ads of genocide, the trials 
will instill an expectation of accountability and will contribute to break-
ing down the culture of impunity in Rwanda. 
In the gamea model, participation is seen not just as a means to an 
end, but as an end in itself,l6S The hopes embedded in the international 
community's embrace of participation are equally embedded in gawca: 
participation as empowering and sustainable, participation as the route 
to building peace, participation as the key to societal transformation. 
This transformation is possible in thr('e ways, First, the community'S 
participation is hoped to have a cathartic element for the victim or vic-
tim's family whose suffering will be publicly acknowledged, Second, 
participation should lead to greater social acceptance of the results of 
the trials and facilitate the reintegration of those found innocent, or those 
who have already served their time while in detention, Third, partici-
pation acknowledges that what happened in 1994 happened in and to 
communities, and allows Rwandans to experience a different sort of 
community mobilization that is geared at rebuilding, not destruction, 
Although many in the internalional community share the Rwandan 
government's hopes for gacaca, human rights groups are approaching 
the gacaca process with strong reservations. The most serious concern is 
about the lack of traditional due process; some see gacaca as a form of 
mob justice, incapable of protecting defendants' rights to a fair triaL The 
opposite resuIt may also occur-some criminal suspects may be freed 
at hearings where witnesses are afraid to publicly identify themselves 
and present evidence. In either case, the Western understanding of "due 
process of law" is largely absent from these proceedings in several 
Trials (Oct, 4, 2001), available al http://www.hrw,org/press/2001/IO/rwandalO04, 
htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2002) [hereinalrer ELECTIONS MAY SPEED GENOCIDE 
TRIALS], 
165. The model's emphasis on partidpation puts it in perfect step with the 
preeminent intefTh'ltional development approach of the 19905, whkh emphasizes 
the virtue of participation. The methodology is not new (first and best articu-
lated by Paolo Freire in the 19705), but it became mainstream wisdom from the 
World Bank to the tiniest NG05 in the 19905. See, e,g., WORLD SA'" PARTICIPA· 
TION SoURCEBOOK (1996), available at htlp://www,worldbank.org/wbi/source-
book/5bhome,htm, 
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respects. First, defendants have no right to counsel, and the state's 
resources go to investigations and prosecutions, but not to defense. 
Second, judges playa prosecutorial role in addition to their convicting 
and sentencing role. Third, the system relies largely upon the willing-
ness of community members to speak out and trusts that social pressure 
will encourage honesty. Social pressure, however, may work against the 
desired honesty, and defendants may find themselves at the mercy of 
fearful \vitnesses, unwilling to speak out in their defense. 
The most reasonable approaches to gacaca balance these hopes and 
concerns. Genocide survivors' group IBUKA notes that survivors may 
be traumatized by reviving painful memories, but that the nation has 
no choice given the "deluge" of cases facing the Rwandan government.1M 
Others weigh the speedy resolution of trials against the lack of tradi-
tional due process; as articulated by Alison DesForges of Human Rights 
Watch, "[tlhe system has flaws, but it provides the only real hope for 
trials in the foreseeable future for more than 100,000 persons now 
detained in inhumane conditions."H>7 In desperate need of a way to move 
quickly bu t in a spirit of justice, the Rwandan government has devel-
oped what seems likely to be a sturdy mechanism to empower thou-
sands of communities to move forward together in their reconstruction 
of society under the law. 
F. COMPLEMENTARITY AMONG THE SYSTEMS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The experimce of Rwanda's efforts to create accountability for geno-
cide provides a valuable model of complementarity among distinct 
accountability mechanisms. The model's complicated structure is with-
out precedent in international law, and is all the more impressive for 
having developed organically; as one mechanism's inadequacies showed, 
another mechanism was developed to compensate for those weaknesses. 
This architecture for accountability experienced its share of growing 
pains and still has room for improvement, but the functioning of these 
three mechanisms offers Rwanda an opportunity to achieve its goals of 
justice, deterrence and reconciliation, as well its broader goal of elimi-
nating the culture of impunity. 
166, Helen Vesperini, Rwanda i-o Start Genocide Tnals at Village Courts, EAST-
ERN AFruCA TIMES (ONU!':E Eomo;J) (July 25, 2002), "vailable at http://www.east-
ernabcatimes.com/news/2002/june/rwal006.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2002). 
167. See ELECT]OKS MAY SPEED GENOCiDE TRL<\L5, supra note 164. 
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The lessons emerging from the response to genocide in Rwanda are 
instructive not just for the pursuit of justice within Rwanda, but for the 
international community more broadly and for any future efforts to build 
structures of accountability in similarly challenging contexts. 1\;0 single 
prescription from the U,N. and other international bodies can fix every 
country's ailments, but the Rwandan experience does provide" general 
template for action, urging international and national actors to learn to 
work together in mutually reinfordng ways, Having addressed the rel-
ative effectiveness of each mechanism earHer in the chapter,. we now 
look not at whether the mechanisms are as good as they could be, but 
rather at whether the over arching goal of accountability for genocide in 
Rwanda could be achieved adequately without all three instruments 
working together. We will describe the ways in which the three mecha-
nisms complement each other, examine the sometimes diificult lessons 
from the Rwandan experience, and consider what that entire experience 
may mean for the future operation of the International Criminal Court. 
1. The Vision of Complementarity 
An exceptionally complex event like the Rwandan genocide calls 
for exceptional legal responses, As this chapter attempts to show, no one 
legal body is equipped to respond on the necessary scale, and no one 
legal body's mandate is flexible and diverse enough to accommodate 
the often-competing goals for accountability in the aftermath of mas-
sive crimes against humanity. The concept of complementarity recog-
nizes such compleXities and offers a way through them: by allowing 
multiple mechanisms to respond to events like the Rwandan genocide, 
the legal response becomes greater and more effective than the sum of 
its parts. 
H would be helpful to first clarify what complementarity is not. 
Complementarity is not simply about dividing up the judicial workload, 
[n the early vision of the ICTR's role, for example, commentators seemed 
to confine its role to being little more than an extra pair of hands in the 
task of holding perpetrators of the genocide accountable, Indeed, the 
Rwandan government occasionally subscribes to this perspective and 
bemoans the resources that are "wasted" on the ICTR. Nor should a 
mechanism like gacaca be lmderstood as primarily being about reduc-
ing the backlog of cases, although this will be a significant benefit of the 
process, Such views are short-sighted. Complementarity's effectiveness 
should not be measured in simp Ie terms of the numbers of cases tried 
or the numbers of individuals released from prison, Rather, comple-
mentarity must be understood in terms of its ability to advance the over-
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all goals of accountability, and in te rms of the role that each mechanism 
plays in achieving those goals, 
If complementarity relates to each mechanism's role in achieving an 
overall goal-here, accountability-then the international community 
and Rwanda have clearly forged complementary relationships despite 
some grinding tensions along the way, and despite ongoing room for 
improvements in the various mechanisms. The ICTR clearly plays a role 
that no other body at the time could have played, notwithstanding its 
tense relationship with the Rwandan government. First, the creation of 
the JCTR holds the international community accountable for what it 
failed to do in 1994. The genocide indicted the international commu-
nity's failure to intervene, and the creation of the lCTR by the Security 
Council was a belated but appropriate recognition that the international 
community had some responsibility for what happened in Rwanda in 
1994. Only a visible institution with an international mandate could 
effectively acknowledge this responsibility; international support for 
Rwandan efforts would have been less visible and probably less durable, 
since funding could have been cut without the world paying much atten-
tion, Second, the [CTR's creation permitted the world to acknowledge 
the events of 1994 and to keep an accurate record of the genOcide. The 
ICTR has created an impressive official body of detailed information 
that will brook no denial of the horrors of the genOCide. This truth-gath-
ering function of the leTR will aid in the quest for reconciliation, much 
as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was designed 
to do. Third, on a practical level, the ICTR was able to compel the extra-
dition of suspected genocidaires, something that Rwanda has had diffi-
culty doing c'n its own. 
The national genocide trials in Rwanda likewise meet unique needs 
in the quest for accountability for genocide. First, these trials permit 
Rwanda to show the world and its own people that the post-genocide 
government intends to dismantle the culture of impunity in Rwanda. 
Three decades of impunity for violence against Tutsis ended in 1996 
when the genocide trials began. Adhering as well as possible to inter-
national standards for fair trials, the courts have already brought thou-
sands of suspects to justice. The courts have therefore played an 
instructive role, showing Rwandans how to achieve justice through the 
rule of law, Second, the Rwandan judicial system's tremendous increase 
in capacity serves another critical goal, namely sustainability. The lCTR 
is not permanent, and when it finishes, the Rwandan judicial system 
will need to keep working, not just on genocide crimes but on the full 
range of crimes awaiting prosecution in Rwanda. IncreaSing the dura-
bility and sturdiness of the Rwandan judicial system is the only way to 
maintain accountability over the long term. 
.. 
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Finally, the Rwandan genocide trials serve the goal of deterrence in 
a way that the [CTR does not. The deterrent effect of the ICTR, such as 
it is, seems directed at the international community writ large, not at 
Rwandans in particular. The limited temporal mandate of the ICTR 
means that Rwandans know that nothing they do in the future will be 
the subject of an ICTR investigation or indictment. Because the ICTR 
will not exist permanently, and because the ICTR's mandate is limited, 
it can only hope to deter genocide in a general way: by creating fear that 
the international community would establish a similar body to deal with 
future crimes. By contrast, the Rwandan system is more permanent. The 
short-term goal of the genocide trials in Rwanda may be individual 
accountability for the perpetrators of genocide, but the longer term goal 
is the creation of a system that Rwandans of all ethnicities believe will 
prosecute such crimes in the future, should they occur, and which there-
fore exerts an important deterrent pressure on would~be genocidaires, 
Gacaca, too, plays a unique role in the Rwandan architecture for 
accountability. Gocaca is the only mechanism explicitly designed to 
achieve one of the principle objectives of the Rwandan government: rec-
onciliation. With their emphasis on individual accountability, neither 
the ICTR nor the Rwandan national judicial system could play this role 
directly. Because gamea occurs in and is governed by the communities 
that suffered during the genOcide, gamea allows Rwandans to partici-
pate in the new model of accountability and the new efforts to break 
down the culture of impunity. 
Beyond its unique role, gamea is likely to complement the lCTR and 
the national genOCide trials in three ways. First, gamra complements the 
deterrent role played by the national genocide trials. Fear that one may 
be judged by one's neighbors, and knowledge that such a judgment 
could carry a prison sentence, should act as at least a minor deterrent 
to those who might consider partaking in any renewed violence. Second, 
gacaca has a truth-telling aspect that complements the records being cre-
ated at the national and international levels. Although the gacaca courts 
will not keep the same kinds of formal records that the Rwandan judi-
ciary and the ICTR keep, the effect of speaking the truth in front of a 
large community cannot be underestimated in a country where oral tra-
dition and oral history is so important.168 Third, the thousands of gacaca 
trials that are currently underway in Rwanda will create a wealth of 
information that will be useful to the national genocide trials and the 
168. Andrew Harding. Rwanda's Slow Ju,tice, BBC NEWS (May 19,2001) (not-
ing the influence of oral trad ition on other parts of the legal resporu.e to geno-
cide, specifically the lCrR), available al http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
programmes / from_ our_ Q\'Vn __ ('orrespondent / 1338263.stm, 
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lCTR trials. One human rights organization has already directed US. 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Pierre-Richard Prosper, to 
the gacaca trials in one commune for evidence that might convince the 
United States to find and extradite a suspected gcnacidaire.:6' 
Beyond the role that each mechanism plays in furthering the m'er-
all goals of accountability in the aftermath of the Rwandan genOcide, 
the complementarity of mechanisms seems like an appropriate symbol 
of the gruesome fact that local, national and international actors all need 
to atone for actions taken and not taken in 1994. Any legal response that 
existed on only one or two of these levels would be unable to fully meet 
the demands of accountability. 
2. The Particular Challenges Posed by Concurrent Jurisdiction 
Despite ongoing setbacks and ,,;maining hurdles, the three mecha-
nisms chosen to pursue accountability and justice in Rwanda have func-
tioned together remarkably well, given the challenges of delivering 
justice on three levels simultaneously. However, two key challenges 
remain. both related to the concurrent jurisdiction shared by the ICTR 
and the Rwandan naticmal judiciary. 
The first challenge relates to the sometimes-competing principles of 
concurrent jurisdiction and national sovereignty. 'Ine ICTR's primacy over 
the Rwandan judiciary has led to some of the worst tension in the rela-
tionship between these bodies. Fundamental to international law is the 
principle that "a nation-state has jurisdiction to prosecute crimes com-
mitted within its territory and by its own nationals."I?O [n the Rwandan 
case, the ICTR can prosecute such crimes, regardless of whether or not 
the Rwandan govemment is able and willing to prosecute the crimes itself. 
The ICTR's primacy has created resentment in Rwanda over Rwanda's 
inability to prosecute some of the most serious cases of genocide and has 
diminished the educational and deterrent effects sought by the L:nited 
Nations Security Council when establishing the ICTRl71 This disern-
powering aspect of ICTR thus frustrates and diminishes the work the 
Rwandan government is doing to break down the culture of impunity. 
169, Rakiya Omdar, Cornmtmicatiorr to Ambassad(Jr~tlt~Larsc for War Crimes 
issues, AFRiCA NEWS SfRV. (July 25, 2002). 
170. Evo Popoff; lnconsi,<jterrcy arid Impunity in International Human Rights 
Law: Can the Infernational Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda 
and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33 GEO. WASH. I>in L. REV. 363, 371 (2001). 
171. See Stanley Foundation, Post-Cof~llicf Justice: The Role oj the International 
Community (Apr. 1997): available at http://reports.stanleyfoundation.org/ 
Vantage97.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,2002), 
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Despite the Rwandan government's substantial efforts to reconstruct the 
national judiciary and make it function according to international stan-
dards of due process,'" the ICTR's ability to exercise jurisdiction over cer-
tain cases implies that the international community believes that Rwanda's 
commitment to justice and capacity to provide it are not now, and never 
will be, quite good enough. 
The concurrent jurisdiction problem also relates to a second chal-
lenge, which is the disparity in sentencing possibilities. Those accused 
of the worst crimes are usually tried by the ICTR, which does not per-
mit the death penalty, while many of those accused of lesser crimes face 
the death penalty in Rwanda; such inequities frustrate the Rwandans 
and alarm international human rights groups. Notwithstanding the 
increasing conviction among members of the international community 
that the death penalty is a violation of human rights. no legal consen-
sus under international law expressly forbids the death penaltyY' The 
decision not to impose the death penalty in ICTR trials is "essentially a 
question of determining whether, because of moral considerations, con-
ceptions of justice prevailing in certain sodeties should prevail over that 
of the Rwandese people."171 [n this contest between competing concep-
tions of justice, the Rwandan conception did not carry the day, which 
compounds the disempowering aspects of the ICTR Anytime that choices 
are being rnade about concurrent jurisdiction, the benefits must be 
weighed against these real costs to both national sovereignty and the 
empowerment of national judicial systems. 
3. lessons for the Future and for the ICC 
The Rwandan experience with three different accountability mech-
anisms provides a rich source of lessons for future efforts to provide 
accountability in the aftermath of crimes against humanity. Many have 
noted that Rwanda's long tradition of lack of accountability helped 
lead to the 1994 genocide. This tradition can best be remedied through 
cooperation between the international community and the Rwandan 
government. 
172. The extent to which Rwanda is successfully adhering to due process 
standards is debated, Compare STATE DEPARTMENT 2001 HCMAN RIGHTS REPORT. 
supra note 113, witlt TROUBLED COURSE OF JUS11CE, Sl'pra note 75. 
173. Payam Akhavan, Current De-oe1opmenfs,' Tile Interw1fiona! Crimit1111 
TribunalIor Rwandfl, the Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment,. 90 Al\1, J, INT'L L 
501, 508 (1996). Buf see Council of Europe: Protocol 10 the COllvention ~ftjr the 
Protection of HuttlfJn RigltfS and Fundamental F'"ecdoms Concerning the Abolition of 
the Deatl, Penalty, 22 I.L.!\-\' 538 (1985). 
174. See Akhavan, supra note 173, at 508. 
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The new International Criminal Court (ICC) will substantially alter 
the way the international community handles genocide and wide-spread 
crimes against humanity, such as occurred in Rwanda. The ICC will 
create an entirely new set of issues regarding international-national 
relationships over the prosecution of genocide r war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity. l,;nlike the jurisdictional rules of the Rwanda tribu-
nal, the ICC's jurisdictional mandate took effect before the crimes it will 
prosecute occur. 173 Thus, the debates over temporal juri sdiction, so con-
tentious in Rwanda, will not be an issue. The ICC will also have juris-
diction over individuals around the world, in contrast to the ICTR's 
jurisdiction only over individuals who committed crimes in Rwanda, 
or Rwandans who committed crimes in neighboring states. Nevertheless, 
the Rwandan experience offers important lessons for the new world of 
international accountability, in which the ICC is bound to playa piv-
otal role. 
d. Each Level Needs to See Itself as Being Part of a Whole 
Each accountability mechanism may have some subset of goals that 
are unique to itself, but one lesson from Rwanda is that the actors in 
these separate mechanisms must remember that they all share the same 
ultimate goal: accountability for the genocide. Where those involved in 
each mechanism remember this, as in the relationship between the 
national genocide trials and the gacaca trials, complementarity is at its 
best. Where they forget this, as in the relationship between the Rwandan 
government and the ICTR, complementarity is weaker. 
The Rwandan government initiated both the national genocide tri-
als and the gacaca process as two mechanisms working together toward 
the same goal. Both mechanisms have an overarching goal of account-
ability and justice; gacaca emphasizes accountability and reconciliation. 
Nevertheless, these efforts are viewed as mutually reinforcing, so it is 
perhaps unsurprising that little tension has arisen between the two mech-
anisms thus far. Indeed, the complementarity between these two bod-
ies' roles is striking. Together, they build the legal capacity of institutions 
(national genocide trials) and individuals (gacaca), engaging both in the 
project of rebuilding and reconciliation. The jurisdictional boundaries 
175. ICC jurisdiction took effect on July 1, 2002. See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc A/Conf. 183/9, July 17, 1998, available 
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm; U.N. Diplomatic Conference 
Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Criminal 
Court, U.N. Doc. L/2889 (July 20,1998). 
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of each are clear, and there have been no reports of tension about which 
cases get tried in which forum. 
By contrast, both the international community and the Rwandan 
government often perceive the national genocide trials and the ICTR tri-
als as being in direct competition. By focusing on resources and speed 
of trials, the Rwandan government ignores the real contributions that 
ICTR can make and has made toward its specific goals and toward the 
goal shared by all three mechanisms: accountability for genocide. 
Likewise, the international community's criticisms of the Rwandan 
national genocide trials ignore the distinct hope that the Rwandan gov-
ernment has for using the trials to teach Rwandans about justice and for 
eliminating the culture of impunity. Each side must view the other as a 
necessary part of achieving full and lasting accountability, and filter crit-
icisms through that lens. 
The frequent lack of understanding between the Rwandan govern-
ment and the [CTR points toward Ihe need for education and exchange 
between all levels involved in the process of creating accountability. The 
disagreement over the death penalty is but one example of a disagree-
ment where the U.N. and human rights groups could have better 
explained their justification for opposing the death penalty for the crimes 
of genOcide that occurred in Rwanda, and could have worked to increase 
judicial and legal competency in national courts where the death penalty 
was to be applied. Another source of tension-the plea bargain-could 
pOSSibly have been circumvented had the ICTR presented the concept, 
not as afait accompli, but as a subject for national dialogue and debate 
in Rwanda; when such innovations are imposed without discussion, 
they may initially undermine the efforts to achieve local legitimacy. 
b. The International Community and the National Government 
Must Take the long View in Their Response to Genocide and 
Crimes Against Humanity 
The theme of breaking down the culture of impunity emerged early 
in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, and helped provide a long-
term vision for the legal response to genocide. This long-term vision is 
both appropriate and necessary. It is appropriate because the genocide 
was not caused by the assassination of President Habyarimana but 
instead had rools that stretched back through de<:ades of Rwandan his-
tory. It is necessary because a legal response that took only a shari-term 
view would have done little to prevent such crimes from recurring in 
the future. 
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The rCTR's lack of focus on the long term is its greatest weakness; 
the ICC's focus on the long term is its greatest hope. The ICTR's tem-
poral jurisdiction takes a narrow view of the timeframe for the geno-
cide, and its lack of permanence makes it unlikely that it would be in 
existence to prosecute such crimes in the future. By comparison, the 
ICC's jurisdiction became effective in July 2002, and if such atrocities 
were to recur in the future, the ICC would be able to prosecute crimes 
committed during the planning stages as efiectively as the execution of 
the atrocities themselves. Moreover, the ICC's permanence is bound to 
help it playa greater deterrent role than the ICTR ever could, since 
would-be genocidal res know that they could be called before the tribu-
nal regardless of who holds power domestically. The very existence of 
the ICC therefore helps break down the culture of impunity by holding 
out the possibility of justice for all. 
c. Internafiona! I\ssistance Musl Focus Not Just on !nternational 
Bodies, but also on Strengthening Domestic Systems 
The Rwandan experience clearly shows that a purely international 
response (X)uld not meet all the goals of accountability in the aftermath 
of genocide and crimes against humanity. The ICTR has been success-
ful with individual-level accountability, but has been unsuccessful at 
promoting reconciliation and at helping Rwanda rebuild a culture based 
on the rule of law. The best equipped, best staffed, best funded inter-
national tribunal in the world would still have some disempowering 
effect on local efforts to achieve justice and would still do little to pro-
mote reconciliation. The Rwandan experience emphasizes that national 
institutions must be strengthened before nations can grapple seriously 
with accountability. 
The international role in strengthening domestic systems cannot be 
overstated: from direct funding for public defenders to high-level train-
ing of judges, from the physical restoration of courts to the provision of 
law books, international aid for national judiciaries would be money 
well spent. The expense associated with making judicial projects a pri-
ority should be assessed not in com-parison to other in-country priori-
ties like health or education, but in comparison to the peacekeeping 
expenses associated with preventing crimes against humanity and restor-
ing order once those crimes have occurred; any foreign aid that helps 
break down a country's culture of impunity must be considered cost-
effective in this longer term view. 
The international community must also be willing to support inno-
vations like gacaca. If for no other reason, interested donors can help to 
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ensure that such mechanisms are fair. More fundamentally. support for 
locally developed processes acknowledges that exclusive reliance on 
courtroom-style judicial proceedings is probably inadequate, and may 
perversely exacerbate local tensions and alienate the individuals the 
international community is hoping to protect. Gacaca has met with a 
great deal of skepticism internationally, but it is seen domestically as a 
hope and a possible salvation; support despite misgivings would be a 
humble but appropriate measure for an international community that 
clearly has not always acted in Rwanda's best interests. 
d. rhe Architecture for Accountilbilily f'v1ust Be Innovative and' 
Flexible 
The Rwandan experience shows the limits of formal court tribunals, 
and points toward the need for innovation and flexibility as part of a 
comprehensive response to crimes against humanity, The gacaca process 
is perhaps the most interesting element of the legal response to the 
Rwandan genocide. The gacaca process is an innm'ation highly appro-
priate for the local culture, since its roots lie in the Rwandan tradition 
of community-based justice. Cacaca is also highly appropriate for the 
goal of making accountability the project of eyery Rwandan affected by 
genocide-its emphasis on participation ensures that the lessons of break-
ing down the culture of impunity will be learned in all the communi-
ties where the genocide took place. 
We do not argue that a gawca-style process is called for in every sit-
uation where genocide or crimes against humanity occur/ or that gacaca 
is a faultless process that will in itself solve the problem of the Rwandan 
culture of impunity. Rather we argue that accountability is ultimately 
best served by the indusion of an innovative locally designed process 
in the legal response to genocide. What the Rwandan government did 
in the aftermath of genocide was to deiine its goals. and look to see how 
those goals were and were not being met by existing mechanisms, The 
gacaca process emerged from the recognition that the existing mecha-
nisms could deliver justice neither swiftly enough nor inclUSively enough. 
It is this willingness to be flexible in trying different approaches, and to 
use innovation to make the legal response whole that is a powerfulles-
son from the Rwandan experience. 
Thls lesson will become increasingly important as the ICC firmly 
establishes itself. With permanent staff, time-tested procedures and an 
ever-growing body of case law, the ICC in a few years may induce a 
kind of inertia that would make national-level innovation less appeal-
ing, especially in resource-poor countries, and possibly more difficult. 
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If countries that lack resources start to use the ICC trials as a substitute 
for domestic processes, then accountability will suffer for, as we have 
seen, the extent to which such trials can achieve accountability is sharply 
circumscribed by mandate, process and distance. There will almost 
always be a useful role for some kind of locally developed forum to par-
ticipate in the work of accountability, and reliance on the ICC must not 
blind countries to that reality. 
e. International Accountability Mechanisms Must Respect 
Domestic Views of Justice 
One important and positive difference between the ICC and the ICTR 
is that. although there is concurrent jurisdiction between the ICC and the 
country which otherwise has jurisdiction, the ICC will not have the same 
primacy over national courts. If a trial is being prosecuted fairly and 
effectively in the national court, then that court maintains jurisdiction. 
The ICC steps in only where a state with jurisdiction over the rna Iter of 
concern "is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution" or where a state decision not to prosecute "resulted from 
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute." ,'76 
Therefore, tensions like those that existed in Rwanda over national sov-
ereignty and the death penalty will be much less likely to arise. 
Nonetheless, the ICC and the eN. will still need to walk a careful 
line between aggressive international prosecutions and the protection 
of local autonomy in judicial matters. Aggressive international prose-
cution could have the same disernpowering effects that have been 
described above in terms of the ICTR's relationship to the Rwandan gov-
ernment. Especially where the failure to prosecute results from weak 
capacity and not weak political will, the international community should 
first consider ways to strengthen domestic systems instead of consis-
tently opting for international prosecution. Another reason to favor 
national prosecutions is the problem posed by conducting justice at a 
distance. The disconnect that average Rwandans feel toward the pro-
ceedings in Arusha bodes poorly for the extent to which the ICC will be 
a useful tool for reconciliation. Although it may be extremely effective 
for individual-level accountability, the people who were harmed by the 
genocide or by crimes against humanity are unlikely to feel as vested in 
the results of a far-away tribunal as they are in the results of a tribunal 
whose daily proceedings they can follow dosely. There will always be 
a role for trials at both levels, and the international community will do 
well to support local-level trials wherever pOSSible. 
176. Id. at art. 17. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
The international community has played an active role in punish-
ing those accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity on 
several occasions during the 20th century. International actors should 
continue to focus on these mallers in the 21st century, but they should 
also build upon promising i1movations that go beyond traditional court-
centered means of accountability, and search for numerous, comple-
mentary ways to heal nations torn apart by violence. In time, an 
international strategy that goes beyond the creation of international 
criminal tribunals and that works with, rather than above, local gov-
ernments will be more effective in redressing wrongs and preventing 
future atrocities. With careful attention to the lessons offered by the 
Rwandan experience, the International Criminal Court can be an inte-
gral part of any such complementary response to genocide and crimes 
against humanity in the future. 
While the international community absorbs the lessons from Rwanda's 
experience, it must not forget that this is a living process, a process with 
rOom for improvement and with need for continued international sup-
port. The three legal mechanisms responding to the genocide in Rwanda 
should, at a minimum, be able to bring most of those guilty of genocide 
in Rwanda to justice, but neither Rwanda nor the international com-
munity should lose sight of an even higher goal. The highest honor that 
can be paid to those whose lives were destroyed in the genOCide will be 
the rebuilding of Rwandan society along more inclusive lines, so that 
the events of 1994 are not repeated. If law is to playa central role in this 
larger task, the Rwandan government must allow its legal system to 
Serve as a model of accountability for all and to become an institution 
in which all Rwandans, of any ethnic or political background, can place 
their trust. aniy then will the culture of impunity be truly dismantled 
and the cycle of fear, exclusion and repression be truly halted. The inter-
national community must continue to support Rwanda as it makes this 
difficult bUI essential journey. 
